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Thesis Abstract
“Never again” expressed the commitment made by allied forces for the prevention of
genocide. In the 59 years since the adoption of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, it has evolved into an erga omnes obligation and a
jus cogen (preemptory) norm. Genocide prevention, however, remains a highly
controversial issue as it draws from the concept of universality central to human rights
discourse at the same time as it changes dominant conceptualizations of state sovereignty.
This thesis assesses the effectiveness of existing practices, norms and risk assessment/
genocide early warning systems in reducing the occurrence of genocide. To frame the
work of this thesis Bruce Cronin‟s theory on International Protection Regimes (IPRs) is
used, for its emphasis on the need for international actors to work toward the “common
good” in order to realize a stable and secure international order. Three cases studies
(Rwanda, Bosnia, and Darfur) are used to help determine what prevention measures were
in place. More specifically, the cases are examined for their effectiveness in: 1)
monitoring on-going and/or escalating conflicts; 2) disseminating information to relevant
individuals in a timely manner; and 3) mobilizing actors‟ response to and prevention of
genocide. The hypothesis that guides my thesis is that only by instituting more efficient
and comprehensive prevention mechanisms will genocide be deterred and global security
promoted. The analysis leads to the conclusion that although, the introduction of the
notion of a responsibility to protect, the subsidization of preventive mechanisms, and the
creation of the Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide the
international community have had a significant impact, there needs to be more efficient
visible and targeted institutional measures put in place.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
“Never again” expressed the commitment made by allied forces to the prevention
of genocide in the wake of the Holocaust‟s slaughter of millions. In the 59 years since
the international community‟s adoption of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (CPPG, Genocide Convention),1 the concepts and
commitments furthered by the CPPG would evolve into a binding norm within the
international system.2 However, the expression “never again” which served as a vehicle
for the creation of the international human rights regime‟s genocide subdivision is also
used by scholars to critique the international community‟s poor record in preventing
massive and systematic murder in many countries.3 The 1,000,000 deaths in Rwanda and
225,000 deaths in Bosnia in the 1990s, and over 300,000 in present day Sudan are the
most recent and glaring cases highlighting the international community‟s lack of resolve
in upholding its responsibility to prevent.4 To date genocide has taken four times more
lives than civil or international wars combined, between 12 to 22 million since 1945. 5
While the inhumane slaughter of defenseless populations should mobilize the
international community on a moral basis, the overall cost of genocide is not
limited to distant “others” whom we cannot see or hear. The reality is that mass

1

The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide would be adopted in the
December 1948 General Assembly Resolution 260. The convention would go into effective on January
1951.
2
This argument is made due to the ratification of this convention by over 140 states and statements made
by the ICTR in their rulings. Additionally the Office of the Special Advisor would argue that genocide
convention has evolved into customary law, binding all states to the goals of the convention.
3
See Barbara Harff. "No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political
Mass Murder since 1955," The American Political Science Review, 97(1), (February 2003): 57-73.; Mark
Levene. Genocide in the Age of the Nation State, Volume 1: The Meaning of Genocide. New York: I.B.
Tauris, 2005.; and Thomas Cushman. “Is Genocide Preventable? Some Theoretical Considerations.
Journal of Genocide Research 5(4), (December 2003): 523- 542.
4
Barbara Harff. "No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political
Mass Murder since 1955," The American Political Science Review, 97(1), (February 2003): 57-73. Table
1- Genocide and Politicides from 1955 to 2001, pp. 60.
5
Ibid, pp. 57.
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killings of this kind greatly threaten international peace and security. As state
sponsored terror, genocide results in short and long term loss of human capital
and stunted economic and developmental potential which is further exacerbated
by the flight of foreign direct investments.6 Barbara Harff draws a correlation
between prior internal conflicts and a habituation of violence that is woven into
the fabric of society highlighting the potential long term affects.7 Additionally,
significant internal displacement, large refugee flows and destabilizing effects
within the region (exemplified in cases such as the Republic of Rwanda, Bosnia
and Sudan) highlight genocide as a leading concern for the international
community.
In this thesis, I consider the totality of the genocide regime8 and offer some
suggestions regarding improving prevention measures. I will examine the international
system‟s existing efforts at prevention in the context of the following hypothesis: I
believe that instituting comprehensive preventive mechanisms that will deter
genocide is essential for the promotion of peace and security within the international
community.
As illustrations of genocide and genocide prevention I will use the cases of
Bosnia, Rwanda and Darfur. The cases have been selected for their occurrence in the
6

Damien de Walque. “The Socio-Demographic Legacy of the Khmer Rouge Period in Cambodia.”
Population Studies, 60(2), (July 2006): 223-231, pp. 223.
7
Barbara Harff. "No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political
Mass Murder since 1955," American Political Science Review, 97(1), (February 2003): 57-73, pp. 62.
8
For the purpose of this work Andreas Hassenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Ruttberger further develop
Stephen Krasner‟s 1983 definition of “regime” as “sets of […] principles, norms, rules and decision
making procedures around which actors‟ expectations converge in a give area of international relations”
and include “transnational network of issue experts who share both a body of causal knowledge
regarding the physical or social processes that require international action and a vision of a better public
policy which they seek to help materialize.” For more on regimes see Andreas Hassenclever, Peter
Mayer, & Volker Ruttberger. “Integrating Theories of International Regimes.” Review of International
Studies, 26(2000): 3- 33, pp. 7 and Stephen D. Krasner. (Ed.) International Regimes. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1983.
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post Cold War (20th- 21st Century) a time when greater harmony of interests was
expected from the permanent members of the Security Council. All cases occurred after
the adoption of the Genocide Convention; they entailed large losses of lives and were
internationally recognized as volatile situations. The examples have the ability to inform
our understanding of the genocide preventions in place at the time and the strengths and
weaknesses of these practices, as well as the genocide regime‟s evolution.
Academically and politically the treatment of genocide detection, reduction or
eradication has been inconsistent, underdeveloped and selective. Scholars have viewed
Genocide Studies as expressing the ideal of prevention, but less than a quarter of existing
literature directly addresses this challenge.9 Within the international system only a
handful of active monitoring and response mechanisms are currently in place and these
are handicapped by political rhetoric and bureaucratic inefficiencies that reduce the
urgency and importance of the topic. The sporadic and discriminatory identification or
labeling of this crime has been largely conditioned by political exchanges which place
alliances before lives. Furthermore, the international community‟s inefficiencies have
encumbered efforts toward mobilization and ignored the fact that genocide ultimately
threatens the stability of the entire international system and the legitimacy of the notion
of the nation state.10
While the precedent for genocide prevention has existed for over a quarter
century, American and Soviet balance of power concerns throughout the Cold War, and,
later bureaucratic desensitization, passivity and fixation with neutrality have restrained

9

Thomas Cushman. “Is Genocide Preventable? Some Theoretical Considerations.” Journal of Genocide
Research 5(4), (December 2003): 523- 542.
10
Bruce Cronin. Institutions for the Common Good: International Protection Regimes in International
Society. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
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the development of genocide prevention mechanisms. The 1990s introduction of a
number of punishment mechanisms that would add greater clarity and accountability to
the regime11 would leave the preventive mechanisms identified by the CPPG dormant and
unattended to. At least partly due to this lack of international preventive mechanisms,
states have used violence against their populace beyond the scope of their normative
rights, resulting in more than 30 genocidal cases since 1945.12
Lacking consensus over the definition of genocide and the legality and legitimacy
of intervention for humanitarian purposes, the international community has failed to
progress toward a comprehensive preventive mechanisms. The 1948 CPPG defines
genocide as “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic,
racial or religious group.”13 This definition remains highly debated due to its exclusion
of political groups, and vagaries regarding group identity, intent and the necessary scope
or number of deaths that are needed before an event is categorized as a genocide.
However, rulings and declarations made by the United Nations General Assembly,
International Criminal Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), International Criminal
Tribunal of Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal Court‟s (ICC) preparatory
commission in recent years have expanded and clarified the CPPG‟s text and provided
substance for international mobilization.
A major obstacle to genocide prevention has been and will continue to be political
will in developed countries. As Mark Levene argues, the true scope of prevention is
11

Deemed by Geoffrey Robertson as the third phase of human rights development. See Geoffrey
Robertson. Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice. New York: The New Press,
2006, preface.
12
Barbara Harff. "No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political
Mass Murder since 1955," The American Political Science Review, 97(1), (February 2003): 57-73.
13
“Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.” 9 December 1948, 78.
United Nations Treaty Series, 277.
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limited based on what he sees as the contending interests and will of major powers in the
international community, as well as that of the international society and the dominant
power (hegemon).14 Findings from the thesis show the importance of political will in
determining a mission‟s success. Wayne Sandholtz warns us against such a narrow
perspective as he points out that norms are not affected by one individual state but evolve
in a social context. Bruce Cronin addresses Levene‟s critique by emphasizing the need
for transparency in preventive measures by limiting the scope of intervention. He further
stresses the need for political will to prosecute offenders, allies or foes alike.
Furthermore, Martha Finnemore argues that growing trends regarding humanitarian
intervention have sidestepped geostrategic considerations.
In a significant step toward genocide prevention, UN Secretary- General Kofi
Annan laid out a five point UN Action Plan to Prevent Genocide and established the UN
Office of the Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide (SAPG) in April of 2004.
However, the office of the SAPG‟s practices in identifying and responding to escalating
cases leaves future genocide prevention in the same bureaucratic hands, and open to the
same public relations bargaining that prevented timely action in Rwanda. 15 What
happened to the promise, “Never again?”
Recent actions by the United Nations and the international community illustrate
the growing strength and influence of human rights. From the creation of international
courts and tribunals to try the crime of genocide and other heinous crimes to

14

Timothy Longman. “Placing Genocide in Context: Research Priorities for the Rwandan Genocide.”
Journal of Genocide Research 6(1), (March 2004): 29- 45.
15
Lawrence Woocher. Developing a Strategy, Methods, and Tools for Genocide Early Warning.
Columbia University, Center for International Conflict Resolution: September 2006.
http://www.un.org/ar/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/Woocher%20Early%20warning%20report,%20200611-10.pdf (accessed March 12, 2010).
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interdepartmental coordination of early warning and action, significant efforts have been
made in the international political arena which promise to greatly reduce the occurrence
of the crime. However, a missing component to genocide prevention is an internationally
coordinated, effective, and early response to increasing violence and genocidal rhetoric.
While the international community may not necessarily be able to respond to and become
a constructive agent in all conflicts, it can reduce the number of outbreaks and reduce the
spillover costs which have long-term destabilizing effects. Fleshing out a comprehensive
approach to genocide identification and prevention will help promote international
security and peace.

9

CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH DESIGN
As noted in chapter 1, the international community‟s failure to work toward the
dual goals of the 1951 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide (CPPG, Genocide Convention) has caused significant loss of
lives, economic degradation, increased refugee flows, and global and regional instability.
By allowing genocidal attacks on civilians to go unchecked, the international community
has allowed for a habituation of violence which will continue to loom as a threat to
international peace and stability.1 As a result, my hypothesis is that only by instituting
more efficient and comprehensive prevention mechanisms will genocide be deterred
and security promoted within the international community.
In order to validate my assertions I have selected the 1994 Rwanda, 1995 Bosnia,
and 2003 Sudan cases to determine what if any prevention measures were in place at the
time of the crisis and how efficient were they. In the course of my discussion, I will
illustrate how evolving norms and practices within the global genocide regime have
changed on such topics as the conceptual utility and validity of the term „genocide,‟ and
attitudes toward global intervention and how the community has increasingly addressed
the gray areas regarding genocide prevention. Discussing these topics will allow me to
gauge what kind of preventive mechanisms can be developed within the current
international structure, the probable limitations and the effectiveness of such measures.

1

Barbara Harff. "No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political
Mass Murder since 1955," The American Political Science Review, 97(1), (February 2003): 57-73.;
Barbara Harff. “The Development and Implementation of Genocide Early Warning Systems: Conceptual
and Practical Issues.” In The Prevention and Intervention of Genocide: Genocide a Critical
Bibliographic Review, Volume 6, edited by Samuel Totten: 63-82. Princeton, NJ: Transaction Publishers,
2008.
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I have used as my basis of selection cases in which there was an overwhelming
death toll of the targeted population within a short time span, cases that occurred after the
adoption of the genocide convention, and Cold War and those of international interest.
These cases will further help illustrate how the concepts of genocide, human rights,
human dignity, and international responsibility have evolved. The cases selected, inform
our understanding of priorities and interests in the current international order.
To identify in what way each case has helped contribute to the international
conceptualization and approach to genocide, I will examine the findings, rulings, and
practices of the United Nations (UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
African Union (AU) and other relevant international actors. By looking at the way in
which genocide prevention has evolved we can gauge the feasibility of certain policy
options. Throughout, I ask what were the prevention systems in place during the crisis
and whether the systems in place were able to effectively: 1) monitor on-going and/or
escalating conflicts; 2) disseminate information to policymakers, experts, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations (IOs) in a timely
manner; and 3) mobilize state and non- state actors‟ response to and prevention of
genocide. I will use a mixture of primary and secondary sources such as journal articles,
books, and official documents and the findings and rulings of the UN and various courts.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
In my research, I aim to assess the effectiveness of existing practices, norms and
risk assessment/ genocide early warning systems in reducing the occurrence of genocide
and to determine how a better system might be developed if it is the case that

11

international practices are ineffective. As a framework with which to look at the
genocide prevention regime‟s evolution and future, I will use Bruce Cronin‟s theory on
international protection regimes (IPRs). According to Cronin, international protection
regimes (IPRs) are significant for the structural repercussions that are imposed on those
who are excluded from legal processes and are victims of repression, violence and state
sponsored terror. More than a morally sanctioned basis for action, international
protection regimes serve the “common good” by lending value to the current international
Westphalian system organization. The strength of International Protections Regimes is
found in their ability to affect the long term maintenance of international peace and
security as it enables the international community to remedy and reduce violent societal
tensions and conflict which are strong threats to peace.
To add to Cronin‟s work I use Wayne Sandholtz‟s theory on cycles of
international norm change and Finnemore and Sikkink‟s norm life cycle theory to help us
place advancements within the genocide regime into context. The international regime
regarding genocide has experienced incremental changes as a result of failures and
successes in the past 20 years. As genocide and similar events have taken place, a richer
response has started to emerge. By identifying how the case studies and genocide
prevention were situated and justified, we can understand how and what form of change
is possible.

DEFINING GENOCIDE
There is a vast divide between academic and legal scholars with respect to
the definition of genocide. Raphael Lemkin first coined the term “genocide,” in the

12

1910s.2 However, his work would not go acknowledged until the full disclosure of
Hitler‟s campaign against European Jews, Blacks, Gypsies and other “undesirables”
during the Second World War. Dr. Lemkin conceived of the crime of genocide as aimed
at:
… [the] disintegration of the political and social
institutions, of culture, language, national feelings, religion,
and the economic existence of national groups, and the
destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity,
and even the lives of the individuals belonging to such
groups. Genocide is directed against the national group as
an entity, and the actions involved are directed against
individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as members
of the national group.3
Yet while the international community adopted Lemkin‟s term it made swift and clear
departures from Lemkin‟s concept, developing it into a vague and highly contested term.4
Situated within this departure is an attempt by academic circles to adhere to the original
definition, scope and intent that was lent to the word by Lemkin, while in legal circles
this practice is abandoned, and to a certain extent frowned upon.
On paper the definition of genocide has arguably remained rather static. Today
the texts of the CPPG and the Rome Statue for the International Criminal Court (ICC)
reflect the original 1948 wording. But the textbook definition should not mask the fact
that on an international scale the definition of genocide has been significantly affected by
the rulings and prosecutions of the two International Criminal Tribunals of the Former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTY and ICTR) established by the United Nations Security

2

Israel Charney. (Ed.) Encyclopedia of Genocide, Volume 1. Santa Barbara, CA: Institute of the Holocaust
and Genocide, 1999, pp. 5.
3
Raphael Lemkin. “Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation - Analysis of Government Proposals for Redress.” Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944: 79 - 95.
4
Gary Bass. Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crime Tribunals. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2002.
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Council, as well as the International Court of Justice (ICJ), debates in the United Nations
General Assembly, other international bodies, state practice and academia. In this respect
these separate but intersecting arenas of discourse have assisted in the development of the
human rights, and specifically genocide prevention, regime within the international
community.
Following a thread of argumentation within Genocide Studies that attempts to
return the term to its original conceptualization, Israel Charney argues that genocide
should be utilized as a generic definition with a categorical number of crimes. Charney
reasons that taking a more inclusive approach is more fitting because:
a generic definition of genocide does not exclude or
commit to indifference any case of mass murder of any
human beings, of whatever racial, national, ethnic,
biological, sexual, cultural, religious, or political definition,
or any other definitions, or totally mixed groupings of any
or all of the above, or random victims who share no
collective identity other than having been at the same place
at the same time the mass murder was committed.5

For Charney, genocide is broken down into eight different forms of crime ranging from
the most severe “genocidal massacre” to the less severe crime of “purposeful or negligent
famine.”6 But in the process he departs greatly from Raphael Lemkin‟s original endeavor
and the dominant definition, scope and perspective embraced by the international
community.
Benjamin A. Valentino and others take a more moderated approach. For
example, Valentino argues that:

5

Israel Charney. “Classifications of Genocide in Multiple Categories.” In Encyclopedia of Genocide,
Volume 1, edited by Israel Charney, 6-8. Santa Barbara, CA: Institute of the Holocaust and Genocide,
1999, pp. 6.
6
Ibid.
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because “genocide” is a term of general interest to
society… and because it carries with it the weight of
powerful moral sanction, many authors have been reluctant
to give it up.7
Barbara Harff, R. J. Rummel, Leo Kuper, and Benjamin A. Valentino acknowledge
Charney‟s moral argument but they instead retain the word genocide in much the same
frame embraced by the international community and utilize other terms to describe
additional crimes. As a result democide, politicide and mass killings have started to arise
within the field to refer to crimes excluded by the CPPG but which are no less important,
severe or distinct and thus deserving of recognition.
Helen Fein has constructed a typology of genocides to delineate between different
motives. According to Fein three types of genocides can be identified: 1) power driven
for a) retributive or b) preemptive purposes; 2) developmental; or 3) ideological
genocide.8 Barbara Harff constructs her own typologies which include politically
motivated killings as well as genocides. Harff‟s typologies are: 1) repressive politicides;
2) repressive/hegemonical politicides; 3) revolutionary mass murder; and 4) retributive
politicide. Harff‟s work highlights the often overlapping political nature of the crime.9
Genocide studies express the ideal of prevention, yet less than a quarter of
existing literature directly addresses this challenge.10 Academically the treatment of
genocide reduction or eradication has been inconsistent, underdeveloped and selective. In
fact as academia has compiled extensive lists of the causes of genocide, often
7

Benjamin A Valentino. Final Solution: Mass Killings and Genocide in the 20th Century. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2004, pp. 10.
8
Helen Fein. Human Rights and Wrongs: Slavery, Terror and Genocide. Boulder, CO: Paradigm
Publishers, 2007, pp. 134-135.
9
Barbara Harff & Ted Robert Gurr. “Toward Empirical Theory of Genocides and Politicides:
Identification and Measurement of Cases since 1945.” International Studies Quarterly, 32(3),
(September 1988): 359- 371, pp. 361-362.
10
Thomas Cushman. “Is Genocide Preventable? Some Theoretical Considerations.” Journal of Genocide
Research 5(4), (December 2003): 523- 542.
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emphasizing the “accelerators” and “triggers” manipulated by elites, it has obscured the
viability of prevention by characterizing the problem in terms of its details. These
practices have removed the solution to genocide from real tangible action. In the end we
are left with Kenneth Waltz‟ wise question “knowledge for what?”11 This is not to say
that long standing tensions (which are often cited by scholars as genocide‟s accelerators)
should not be rectified, by ensuring that development/economic practices are more
inclusive and distributive for greater social equality, or ethnic tensions are reduced by
teaching tolerance and managing diversity, and/ or making governance and power more
accessible.12 Rather, I argue that immediate international action to address and prevent
the outbreak of genocidal violence must emphasize the establishment of clear criteria for
identifying situations as genocide and the creation of mechanisms to assertively act when
necessary. My emphasis is on the short- term conditions that are crucial to preventing
developing situations.
As Rodger A. Citron argues, the legal realist perspective embraced by some
academics hinders the international community‟s progress as their strict adherence to
what the original intent of legal treaties and conventions ends up binding its
possibilities.13 Sandholtz‟s norm change model illuminates how the international

11

Kenneth N. Waltz. “Law and Theories.” In Neorealism and its Critics, edited by Robert O. Keohane, 2746. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986.
12
Amy Chua has argued that free market economic models and universal suffrage favored by the west has
fermented tensions within society. Israel Charney and Ted Gurr emphasize the ethnic tensions within a
society. See Amy Chua. World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred
and Global Instability. New York: 1st Anchor Books, 2004.; Israel Charney. “Genocide Early Warning
Systems (GEWS).” In Encyclopedia of Genocide, Volume 1, edited by Israel Charney: 6-8. Santa
Barbara, CA: Institute of the Holocaust and Genocide, 1999.; Barbara Harff & Ted Robert Gurr.
“Toward Empirical Theory of Genocides and Politicides: Identification and Measurement of Cases since
1945.” International Studies Quarterly, 32(3), (September 1988): 359- 371.
13
Rodger D. Citron. “The Nuremberg Trials and American Jurisprudence: The Decline of Legal Realism,
the Revival of Natural Law and the Development of Legal Process Theory.” In The Nuremberg War
Crimes Trial and its Policy Consequences Today, edited by Beth A. Greich-Polelle. Baden-Baden:
Nomos Press, 2009.
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community‟s tendency to loosely define legal terms has allowed for a certain molding or
regulating of changes within the international arena that is responsive and conducive to
the historical climate. By pulling precedents from a number of sources and constantly
reinterpreting legal terms and treaties, new possibilities are produced for the international
community.
As already noted the CPPG identifies genocide as a crime under international law.
It lays out the acts which come to encompass genocide as those “committed with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part a national, ethnic, racial or religious group.” The acts
enumerated in Article two subparagraphs (a) through (e) as:
a) Killing members of the group;
b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of
the group;
c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in
whole or in part;
d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within
the group;
e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another
group14
General Assembly resolution 96 defined genocide as “a denial of the right of existence of
entire human groups, as homicide is the denial of the right to life of individuals‟ human
beings.”15 Further, Quigley argues that those acts enumerated in Article two
subparagraphs (a) to (e) are “conscious, intentional or volitional acts which an individual

14

“Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.” 9 December 1948, 78.
United Nations Treaty Series, 277.
15
United Nations General Assembly, 1st Session. “Resolution 96 [The Crime of Genocide].” 11 December
1946, p. 188. (A/RES/64/Add. 1) Official Record. New York, 1946.
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could not usually commit without knowing that certain consequences were likely to
result.”16
Further the Genocide Convention lays the basis for the unrealized prevention of
genocide in articles three subparagraphs (b) through (d) and article four. Article three
outlines which acts are “punishable by a competent national or international tribunal.”17
Article three subparagraphs “(b) conspiracy to commit genocide; (c) direct and public
incitement to commit genocide; and (d) attempt to commit genocide” all represent crucial
activities leading up to the outbreak of genocidal activity.18 Article four of the genocide
convention strips “rulers, public officials or private individuals” of their diplomatic
immunities if found to have taken actions in the planning or execution of genocide.19
It is crucial that we recognize the distinct but complementary relationship that
exists between crimes against humanity and genocide. Quigley argues that the
distinctions between the two crimes are that “crimes against humanity of murder are
characterized by the mass or systematic character of killings, whereby genocide is
characterized by an intent to destroy certain specified types of groups.”20 In other words,
genocide depends on the intentions behind acts while crimes against humanity are the
context or backdrop in which they take place. When both crimes against humanity and
genocide occur at the same time it serves as a testament to the severity of the actions
taking place. However, the severity of the crime presses us to place less importance to
the rationale that led each individual to act against their fellow human but the intent of
16

John Quigley. The Genocide Convention: An International Analysis. Burlington, VT: Ashgate
Publishers, 2006., pp. 91.
17
“Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.” 9 December 1948, 78.
United Nations Treaty Series, 277.
18
Ibid.
19
Ibid.
20
John Quigley. The Genocide Convention: An International Analysis. Burlington, VT: Ashgate
Publishers, 2006, pp. 13.
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their actions. This rationale works on both the individual and state level.

Thus the

central distinction between crimes against humanity and genocide, the factor of
intentionality, is also equally important in the consideration of a genocide early warning
system.
The category of genocide‟s protected groups is highly contested. As it stands the
Genocide Convention only identifies national, ethnic, racial and/or religious groups as
possible victims of mass murder/ extermination.21 The International Law Commission
has taken the stance that the protected groups must be permanent, stable and immutable
groups whose existence must be recognizable decades after.22 However, as the brutality
of a slew of Latin American dictatorships in the 60s, 70s and 80s highlighted, significant
human life has been lost as a result of ideological convictions.23 Timothy Longman‟s
discussion of identity in pre and post genocidal Rwanda highlights the fluidity of identity.
According to Longman, what it meant to be of Batutsi “heritage” had different
connotations in pre-colonial Rwanda, during colonialism for the Dutch colonizers as well
as for the colonized, during the Rwanda of the 60s- 80s, during the genocidal campaign
and during the nation‟s recovery from such atrocities.24
However, we are left to question what exactly it means to be a group and how is
determination to take place in pre-conflict situations? The central question is whether the
group really exists or if it is a construction or perception of the relevant parties. The

21

John Quigley. The Genocide Convention: An International Analysis. Burlington, VT: Ashgate
Publishers, 2006.
22
Ibid, pp. 91.
23
See Beth van Schaack. “The Crime of Political Genocide: Repairing the Genocide Convention's Blind
Spot.” The Yale Law Journal 106(7), (May, 1997): 2259-2291; and Israel Charney. (Ed.) Encyclopedia of
Genocide, Volume 1. Santa Barbara, CA: Institute of the Holocaust and Genocide, 1999.
24
Timothy Longman. “Identity Cards, Ethnic Self-Perception and Genocide in Rwanda.” In Documenting
Individual Identity: The Development of State Practices in the Modern World, edited by Jane Caplan &
John Torpey: 345-358. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001.
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answer is critical to genocide prevention. Realistically conceptualizing a legitimate and
internationally accepted response to genocidal situations will rest on the ability of the
Genocide Early Warning Systems (GEWS) to identify groups which fall under the
jurisdiction of the Genocide Convention and getting states to support humanitarian
interventions. The works of Ratner & Abrams and Quigley highlight the delicate line of
this debate. They argue that the ICTR has adopted a subjective approach, with the status
of group members being determined at birth and continuously passed along to their off
spring.25 On the other hand, the ICTY has taken a more objective approach trying to
pinpoint identity based on the self identification of the individuals in question, and
identification by others.26

However, we must frame their contributions based on the

purpose which they serve, as an arena in which crimes are to be tried and are often after
the conflict ends. According to the January 2005 Report of the International Commission
of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Security-General,
the approach taken to determine whether a group is a (fully)
protected one has evolved from an objective to a subjective
standard which takes into account that collective identities,
and in particular ethnicity, are by their very nature social
constructs.”27
Some consensus between academic and legal scholars can be found in the
genocide studies field. Helen Fein defines genocide‟s protected groups as “real groups
that are the source of identity and exist apart from the invention of the state perpetrators,
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whose members are persecuted for who they are, not what they have done.” 28 This is
helpful in establishing what should guide the analysis of protected groups. Arnold
Krammer takes a similar stance, arguing that “to be considered genocide, crimes have to
be committed against groups of people, usually by their government or military power,
entirely … [based on] human factors that are difficult to change or camouflage.”29
John Quigley takes a more structured approach to identifying and defining
genocide. To him intent can be defined as “acts against the immediate victims [which]
must reflect a culpable state of mind in regards to the group. Thus genocide encompasses
a dual mental element: one directed against the immediate victims and a second against
the group.”30 The severity of the crime is not indicated by the number of victims but by
the existence of both genocide and crimes against humanity. In this way “the crimes
against humanity of murder is [sic] characterized by the mass or systematic character of
the killings, whereas genocide is characterized by an intent to destroy certain specified
types of groups.”31
Based on the literature above, in this thesis genocide is understood as:
Severe violation of human rights directly targeting civilian populations;
Acts or policies that could logically be concluded to result in the mass death of
thousands of individuals;
Acts where the targeted population is visibly distinguishable from “authors” of such
acts;
Actions undertaken against groups with a distinguishable religious, ethnic, racial
and/or national character.
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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY
Realism with its emphasis on anarchy, power, military force and state survival has
determined that power-alien32 issues have no real effect on state policy or change within
the international community. Hans J. Morgenthau, for example, argues that
… realist(s) cannot be persuaded that we can bring about
the transformation [of the contemporary world] by
confronting a political reality that has its own laws with an
abstract ideal that refuses to take those laws into account.33
In Man, the State and War, Kenneth Waltz argues that interpreting state action on moral
issues as proof of its singular strength in international relations is committing “… the
fundamental error of interpreting instances where force is not visible as proof that power
is not present.”34 Waltz argues that the structural reality of the international system,
characterized by anarchy, constrains state action within a self-help framework. In
essence realists and neorealists argue that, either because of the selfishness of human
nature or the international structure, states emphasize the national interest in formulating
foreign policy. As a result, humanitarian intervention arises only when it is in the
geostrategic or economic interest of the state or for dubious purposes which mask their
real intent behind moral proclamations.
However, because neo-realists and realists alike emphasize the centrality of state
power and self-interest in international relations, they prove themselves to be dated and
static, choosing to place emphasis on “things as they are” and not on how and why they
have or could develop. Their perspectives fail to account for changes in the international
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system and greatly lack explanatory power in elucidating why and how humanitarian
intervention and human rights more broadly, have found traction within the current
system. From the shadows of the Cold War many concepts and movements have found
international support in ways that realists are unable to adequately explain. Gary J. Bass
and Robert Koenigsberg are the first to point out that realism‟s nationalist turn borders in
many ways on the fanatical hazards of religious and ideational cultist exclusion.35
Liberalism has tried to correct for the errors in realist and neo-realist theorizing by
underscoring their inadequate and static perceptions. Holding true in their own
assessments to points made by realism, such as the anarchic nature of the international
system, rationality of actors, primacy of the state, and constraints, they argue that
cooperative opportunities are more prevalent. Because international relations consist of
ongoing interactions and communications, the general scenario of Prisoners Dilemma
central to realism is incorrect.36 Their ability to grasp the pluralistic nature of states and
the role of international organizations, groups and international networks in the
international arena sheds some light on the creation of regimes. To liberalists when state
preferences (molded by internal ideas, interests, and institutions) are consistent among
states negotiation and coordination is possible for mutual gain. Andrew Morasvcsik
argues that:
while state preferences are (by definition) invariant in
response to changing interstate political and strategic
circumstances they may well vary in response to changing
transnational social context.37
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Thus genocide prevention in the eyes of liberalist reflects a social ideal or overlapping
state preferences. Nonetheless these activities are limited and constrained when
incompatible with other priorities on their list of preferences.
In response to realism‟s glaring failure, Alexander Wendt, argues that “anarchy is
what states make of it.”38 According to Wendt, because “culture, identity, norms and…
actors‟ interest are not fixed but change and arise out of a social context,”39 states
interpret, mold and emphasize norms and trends altering state behavior, international law
and the international structure.40 Wayne Sandholtz illustrates how the use of
“foundational metanorms of international society,” results in the expansion, shape and
influence on how sovereignty is conceptualized.41 Additionally, Sandholtz informs our
understanding of norms‟ persistence by stressing the dialectic relationship between
actors‟ interest and the persuasive power norms have in curtailing state behavior once
established. These approaches explain why and how moral conviction generates
significant norm activity. They place the birth and persistence of norms in state action
and emphasize the constraining power of norms once they are well defined and integrated
into the international system.
Martha Finnemore‟s investigation of the changing purpose of intervention
illustrates how geostrategic considerations have played an insignificant role in explaining
humanitarian intervention. In fact Finnemore argues that, “humanitarian activities in the
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1990s suggest that human rights claims now trump sovereignty and legitimize
intervention in ways not previously accepted.”42
Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger marry realist, liberalist and constructivist
approaches to regime formation and participation. Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger
borrow and expand Stephen Krasner‟s definition of regimes as follows:
sets of […] principles, norms, rules and decision making
procedures around which actors‟ expectations converge in a
given area of international relations … [which are
promoted by a] transnational network of issue experts who
share both a body of causal knowledge regarding the
physical or social processes that require international action
and a vision of a better public policy which they seek to
materialize.”43
They integrate the liberalist focus on state preferences, realist on power relations, with
the “soft” cognitivist emphasis on actors‟ ideational, causal and social impact in the
international system. To Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, genocide prevention is
greater when overall costs do not threaten states‟ interest or security and serve the
preference of a state with minimal and transparent cost and benefits for all participants.
They make concessions for ideational commonalities such as moral concerns or visions
for the international community.
Bruce Cronin argues that the distinct nature of international protection regimes
(IPRs), is a result of their ability to look at the larger picture, and address the overall
stability and survival of the current international system based on sovereign states. IPRs
gain legitimacy and influence states‟ participation and adherence to their mission due to
their ability to address the common good that links the states‟ fundamental goals and
42
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existence with that of the overall collective. Examining the spillover cost of genocide,
such as regional instability and increased refugee flows highlights the accuracy of
Cronin‟s description of IPRs.
Supporting Cronin‟s claim are conclusions drawn from Gary Russell‟s account of
actions taken by smaller states (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden,
Netherland, Spain and Switzerland) as part of the League of Nations in the lead up to the
Second World War.44 Russell argues that when states focus exclusive attention on the
preservation of the state over the deviant and threatening element within the international
community, they allow for central norms of the international community to be trampled
upon and for the introduction of greater anarchy. 45 Their negligence allows for the
erosion of the Westphalian belief in the salience of the territorial sovereignty of the state,
the binding nature of treaties and covenants, and other jus cogen norms.
Support for Cronin and Russell‟s assessment is found in John H. Herz‟ early writing
on the repercussions of the current structural nature of the international community after
the Second World War. According to Herz:
beyond organizational, institutional and legal requirements
the system presupposes for its successful working one main
politico-psychological datum. The realization on the part
of political leadership and public opinion in the various
countries that every country in the world, be it
geographically or politically „near‟ to or „remote‟ from the
location of immediate conflict and aggression has exactly
the same and a superlative, interest in its suppression.46
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A system in which security is a collective issue requires greater participation by all
parties. States must participate in eliminating genocide and mass atrocities as a common
good.

THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
The human rights and human dignity field within the international community has
struggled to formulate a legitimate base for active engagement and assertive action.

At

present the international community still lacks the response mechanisms needed to
prevent the deaths of thousands. A central failure is an inability to transform genocide
prevention into a priority among state preferences, to change how discussion on this topic
takes place, to identify to whom this responsibility falls and what are the contours of
legitimate intervention for humanitarian purposes. As a result the international
community has clothed actions based on moral conviction in a variety of terms in an
attempt to progress their agenda (such as “right to intervene,” “sovereignty as
responsibility,” “human security,” “individual sovereignty,” “humanitarian intervention,”
and “responsibility to protect”).47
Emphasizing the conflicts of sovereignty, Balakrishnan Rajagopal stresses the
existence of a dual role for the state: “…on the one hand law needs to constitute itself as
the “other” of violence to be legitimate; on the other hand it needs to use violence
instrumentally to preserve power.”48 Viewing states through Rajagopal‟s assessment we
find states existing within an intricate framework, first as protector of its populace and at
47
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the same time wielder of “unbound” recourse to violence. Because states must articulate
the boundaries of violence within their territories and abroad to remain legitimate
genocide prevention is intertwined with larger security and sovereignty concerns.
Richard A. Koenigsberg‟s urges us to identify the limits of sovereign monopoly on the
use of force when he asks: “… if the nation-state can sacrifice (kill) its most valuable
citizens—should it not also have the right to sacrifice (kill) citizens who make no useful
contribution to society?”49
Gary J. Bass argues that “humanitarian intervention emerged as a fundamental
liberal enterprise, wrapped up with the progress of liberal ideals and institutions.”50
Michael Walzer conceptualized humanitarian intervention as “law enforcement or police
work”51 in response to activities that “shock the moral conscience of mankind.”52 Gareth
Evans characterizes it as “military force deployed across borders to protect civilians at
risk.”53 James Pattison takes a more detailed approached by defining humanitarian
intervention as “forcible military action by an external agent in the relevant political
community with the predominant purpose of preventing, reducing or halting an ongoing
or impending grievous suffering or loss of life.”54 In all three cases there is an emphasis
on the military nature of this intervention though there is significant divergence on what
is its goal and the extent to which morality plays a role as a motivation.
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Humanitarian intervention has led to a divisive discourse within academia and the
policy world alike. Because humanitarian intervention has often been framed as a right,
it has often grappled with legal and political concerns, overshadowing the humanitarian
and moral imperatives it is intended to address. According to some scholars,
humanitarian intervention abides by central tenets of the UN charter when executed
without the intent “against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state.”55 Yet other advocates argue that it may be an illegal act but it is a politically valid
one.56 A stronger argument is made by non-interventionists who have argued that
humanitarian intervention is illegal because it violates the principles of sovereign rights
and a prohibition on the use of force embedded in the UN charter. Pointing to Article
2(4)‟s prohibition on the use of force, these scholars argue that any form of intervention
in the internal affairs of a state is clearly an illegal and illegitimate act regardless of its
moral basis. 57
Simon Chesterman argues that those who declare the moral strength of
humanitarian intervention and the moral imperatives that should move international and
state action are supporting “a recipe for bad policy, bad law, and a bad international
order.”58 Walzer and Chesterman agree that few if any humanitarian interventions have
ever taken place without the inclusion of dubious or ulterior motives for engagement.59
Byer argues that intervention has been forwarded as a vision of power without
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necessarily creating a system of accountability.60 The divide on humanitarian
intervention has been so great that many believe that it has become increasingly
entrenched within two intransigent camps. As such it has framed humanitarian crisis as
gains for the state and provided only two options to addressing these problems, do
something or do nothing. In his report to the 63rd meeting of the General Assembly the
Secretary- General, Ban Ki-Moon, argued that “humanitarian intervention posed a false
choice between two extremes: either standing by in the face of mounting civilian deaths
or deploying coercive military force to protect the vulnerable and threatened
populations.”61
The independent Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty‟s 2001
report introduced a new concept which would address the policy and legal inadequacies
of humanitarian intervention. Under the term “responsibility to protect,” the commission
reframed the discussion from the “right to intervene” in the internal affairs of a sovereign
to the “responsibility to protect”62 a human population.

In essence humanitarian

intervention has been seen as an extremely state-centric interpretation of moral
responsibility and responsibility to protect is posed as the way forward. Carsten Stahn
argues that recent developments in the international system are “part and parcel of a
growing transformation of international law from a state-and-governing-elite-based
system of rules into a normative framework designed to protect certain human and
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community interest.”63 The creation of international courts and tribunals and a vibrant,
though rather inconsistent, culture of human rights and security within the international
community has focused on individual wellbeing as a central component of foreign policy.
According to Carsten Stahn, “the commission thus used a rhetorical trick: it
flipped the coin, shifting the emphasis from a politically and legally undesirable right to
intervene for humanitarian purposes to the less confrontational idea of a responsibility to
protect.”64 Evans and Sahnoun argue that the responsibility to protect reframed the
discussion: first, by placing priority on those needing assistance, it emphasized the
responsibility of the state and second that of the international community; and second, it
represented an “umbrella concept, embracing not just the “responsibility to react” but the
“responsibility to prevent” and the “responsibility to rebuild” as well.65 The new concept
expanded the dominant understanding of sovereignty as power to one of responsibility
both internally and externally. Nevertheless in dividing a responsibility to protect into
pillars it has allowed for greater discourse and progress to take place.
Under the rubric of a responsibility to protect the commission identified three
pillars to fulfilling this responsibility: “the enduring responsibility of the State to protect
its populations, whether nationals or not, from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and
crime against humanity”;66 “the commitment of the international community to assisting
states in meeting those obligations”;67 and “the responsibility of Member States to
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respond collectively in a timely and decisive manner when a State is manifestly failing to
provide such protection.”68 This position advocated for a more thorough and inclusive
practice that encompassed “diplomatic, humanitarian and peaceful means”69 and
emphasizes shared responsibilities. The approach moves away from a complete emphasis
on intervention and draws the community to consider a spectrum of actions that may help
reduce and prevent conflict.
However, the responsibility to protect is only a step forward and not a full
solution to our problems regarding intervention. As Carston Stahn argues, responsibility
to protect is a “multifaceted concept with various elements.”70 He argues that cutting
across statements made by the International Commission on State Sovereignty and
Intervention, High-Level Panel Report, the Report of the Secretary-General, and the
Outcome Document of the 2005 World Summit is a consensus regarding the duty of
states to their citizens and the “weak sovereignty defense” for their failure71 as well as the
legitimacy of non-forcible intervention. The international community acknowledges that
states that are unwilling to act to protect their citizens do not have the same rights granted
to them as a sovereign. This perspective speaks of the greater image and values the
international community holds. More controversial is the resort to military intervention
and the question of who bears this responsibility. As Stahn argues, “responsibility to
protect is thus in many way still a political catchword rather than a legal norm.”72
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CHAPTER 3: CASE STUDIES
CASE STUDY 1: RWANDA
IGIHIRAHIRO:1 RWANDAN HISTORY
The Republic of Rwanda passed through a handful of European colonial powers
before finally obtaining its independence, but no one colonial power had such a definitive
impact on the societal composition of the state of Rwandan as Belgium. Belgium‟s direct
involvement in the administration of the Rwandan colonial state brought about power,
land, religious, economic and educational reforms that greatly favored the Tutsi
populations. As Prunier argues, the Belgian administration‟s rewriting and eschewing of
Rwandan history created and deepened ethnic tensions which reverberated with the
Rwandan social consciousness up to today.2
Belgium emphasized religion as an organizing arena within the Rwandan state.3
This “did not transcend social fractures, [but rather] reproduced them in many different
dimensions and (albeit unwittingly) exaggerated their effects.”4 The November 1931
removal of King Yuhi V Musinga on charges of adultery and bisexual liaisons, and his
refusal to convert to Christianity and western dress stand as testament to the efforts of the
Belgians to “modernize, simplify and ossify” the Rwandan state. 5 Belgium‟s racial
prejudices and the ability of the Tutsi population to gauge the needs of their colonizer
produced what appeared to be a superior race and a Rwandan cultural mythology, one
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that would be revised and reproduced in the 1957 Hutu Manifesto and in the subsequent
rise of the Hutus to power two years later.6
Under President Kayibanda, a majority ruled “democracy” was installed,
characterized by a complete reversal of the status quo and the marginalization of Tutsis.
Ethnic quotas which utilized “purification” campaigns in schools, universities, civil
service jobs and private businesses, as well as massacres became a useful tool for the
government and local officials, resulting in the creation of a large Tutsi refugee
population (conservative figures place it at about 336,000) in neighboring Uganda, Zaire,
Burundi, and Tanzania.7
Taking advantage of tensions within Rwanda under the Kayibanda regime,
Juvenal Habyarimana rose to power in 1979, maintaining many of the ethnic quota
systems and establishing a “developmental dictatorship.”8 However, all would not
remain peaceful in Rwanda. As economic conditions deteriorated, especially due to
Rwanda‟s growing dependency on income from coffee exports and the fall in prices for
coffee on world markets, power struggles within Habyarimana‟s regime became public
and Tutsi refugees attempted to bring to power Paul Kagame and Fred Rwigyema, two
leading Tutsis, on October 1, 1990.9
The Rwandan civil war drew the attention of the international community. The
French, under the guise of national interest, sent troops to aid the Habyarimana regime
while Christian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and democratic sympathizers
ignored the massacres and terror attacks that occurred from within the Rwandan
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government. These massacre campaigns were precursors to the genocide which occurred
only a few years later.
The Arusha Peace Agreements established a ceasefire, power sharing through the
Broad Based Transitional Government (BBTG) which left President Juvenal
Habyarimana in power (October 1992 and July 1993), a protocol on the repatriation of
the refugees (June 1993), and the integration of the armed forces (August 1993). The
agreement was seen by Hutu extremists as a threat to their power. By October 1992 the
outline of a genocidal plan could be seen as “the protagonists in the future genocide had
all found their places… the FAR [the Armed Forces of Rwanda] had its secret society,
the extremist parties their militia, the secret service its killing squads.”10

UMUGANDA:11 THE GENOCIDE
Established by Security Council resolution 872 the United Nations Assistance
Mission For Rwanda's (UNAMIR) was charged with the mandate to:
assist in ensuring the security of the capital city of Kigali;
monitor the ceasefire agreement, including establishment of
an expanded demilitarized zone and demobilization
procedures; monitor the security situation during the final
period of the transitional Government's mandate leading up
to elections; assist with mine-clearance; and assist in the
coordination of humanitarian assistance activities in
conjunction with relief operations.12
Equipped with 2,500 troops and no intelligence capabilities, the mission was
inadequately equipped for the work ahead. UNAMIR arrived in Rwanda on August 4,

10

Gerard Prunier. The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide. New York: Columbia University Press,
1995, pp. 169.
11
The word means collective work session,
12
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. “United Nations Assistance in Rwanda.”
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamirM.htm.

35

1993, tasked with the maintenance of the ceasefire between the Rwandan Government in
Kigali and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in Northern Rwanda. The rebel RPF,
mostly composed of Tutsi refugees who had been persecuted for decades, had called for
the return of Tutsis to the Rwandan home in late 1990.
UNAMIR‟s mission was to usher in a new wave of power sharing among
Rwandan Tutsis and Hutus, one that directly threatened the country‟s three decade old
social structure. Under the Arusha Peace agreement power sharing was to finally occur
between Hutus and their Tutsi counterparts. By January 1994, however, information had
arrived to head officials within UNAMIR that Hutu extremists were attempting to derail
the peace agreement. According to the informant, Hutus had arrived on a plan to
exterminate their Tutsi counterparts and target Belgian troops in order to induce western
powers to remove their troops from the country.
Lieutenant- General Romeo Dallaire wrote his supervisors in the United Nations
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), then run by Kofi Annan, about the
impending attacks and indicated that he was prepared to raid the weapons stockpiles.
However, Lieutenant- General Dallaire was stopped by his supervisors when UNDPKO
ordered him to stay within the bounds of his mission and avoid taking action. Instead the
UNDPKO opted to inform the Rwandan government of the plans. With such a tepid
response Hutu extremists gained confidence that their activities would go unopposed
when finally carried out.
On April 6, 1994 at 8:30 am as the Rwandan presidential plane was descending
into Kigali airport with President Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda and President Cyrien
Ntaryamira of Burundi (both Hutus), it was shot down by an unidentified faction. Soon
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after the death of the president, Colonel Theoneste Bagosora, a Hutu extremist, seized
power. By 9:15 am Interhamwe’s13 roadblocks were in place throughout the Rwandan
capital of Kigali, and throughout the nation as the massacre of the Tutsi minority
commenced. The massacre of the Tutsis was conducted by local level Hutus wielding
handheld tools such as machetes and masu (a handmade weapon).
Belgium and Guinean peacekeepers were quickly dispatched to protect the Acting
Prime Minister of Rwanda Agathe Uwilingiyama. As a moderate leaning politician, she
was a huge target for Hutu extremists wishing to carry out their plans of extermination.
According to some accounts, the Rwandan army surrounded and invaded the compound,
taking the UN peacekeepers‟ weapons, and killed the Prime Minister.14 To fulfill the
second part of their plan to sway western nations‟ political will within the state, ten
Belgian peacekeepers were taken hostage and killed. Among others targeted and killed
during the first days of the genocide was Joseph Kavaruganda, President of the
Constitutional Court, Charles Shamukiga, a civil rights activist, and Frederic
Nzamurambaho, Minister of Agriculture and the Social Democratic Leader (PSD)
leader.15
With the loss of ten of their peacekeepers, Belgium sought a “dignified” way to
walk away from the chaos engulfing Rwanda. They contacted Western states in an
attempt to coordinate a unified approach to their withdrawal in order to save face. On
April 9th one thousand French and Belgian troops arrived to rescue their expatriates.
While French and Belgian troops traveled across the country rescuing their citizens,
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Tutsis who had taken refuge with these foreign protected groups were left for the Hutu
extremists to wipe out. As the Tutsi population fled for their lives, congregating at
churches, stadiums, and official buildings, the army and national police stepped in and
used more “sophisticated” measures to eradicate the Tutsi population congregated in
these “safe centers.” As these atrocities were taking place, Western powers questioned
what was the right way of withdrawing “gracefully” from the state, how many of their
troops were to be left behind and what was the mission for those remaining troops.
When Rwandan human rights activist, Monique Mujawamaliya, attempted to
formulate a stronger response from the US she was informed by some US officials that
“the United States does not have friends, just interests and because no US interest could
be served by intervening in the Rwandan case there was no interest in sacrificing
American lives in that conflict.”16 The UN abandoned General Dallaire and the
UNAMIR mission, ordering the withdrawal of 90 percent of the UN peacekeeping troops,
leaving behind only 450 poorly equipped troops from developing countries.
By the end of the first month the only outsider remaining in Rwanda was the
International Red Cross, led by Philippe Gaillard, who drew media attention to attacks on
Red Cross convoys, thus inducing the Rwandan government to give the organization safe
passage throughout the country.17 The Red Cross‟ network of aid workers was the only
source of information regarding the atrocities and the death count. According to their
estimates, by the first two weeks well over 100,000 Rwandans were killed. It is
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estimated that the Red Cross, as a result of its work during the crisis, was able to save
65,000 lives.18
Gregory “Gromo” Alex, a member of the UN Humanitarian Assistance team
stationed in Kigali talked about the climate within Rwanda and how it constrained his
ability to carry out his work.
[We] started as early as we could in the morning not too
early we tried to finish it as early in the afternoon as
possible because that… by noon they had been drinking
and were intoxicated and they had either killed peopled and
wanted to kill more or hadn‟t killed and wanted to kill.
Killing was like a drink that if you took one drink you
wanted another and another you wanted to get more and
more intoxicated.19
By May 17, 1994 the Security Council finally changed course and authorized the addition
of 5,000 troops to the UN peacekeeping operation, UNAMIR. However, few if any
member states were willing to give to the operation. On May 25th President Bill Clinton
reaffirmed America‟s intervention policy stressing the need for US interest as a central
determinant of American action. While the United States offered to provide logistical
support and 50 armored personnel carriers, it took three months for them to finally arrive
in Rwanda.
July 1994, the Rwandan genocide ended, approximately 100 days after it started,
with the triumph of the Rwanda Patriotic Front‟s against the Hutu extremists. At the end
of the ten week massacre some 800,000 Tutsis, over 80 percent of the overall Rwandan
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Tutsi population, and an additional 100,000 Hutu sympathizers had been killed while the
world watched.20 The Tutsis that survived were referred to as those not finished off yet.

ASSESSMENT
With approximately 80 percent of the targeted Tutsi population massacred in
roughly 100 days, the Rwandan genocide‟s efficiency was a jarring reality. Orchestrated
by the Hutu extremists, the genocide‟s successful execution was a testament to the
failures of an international community unwilling to involve itself in the affairs of a
country which served little geopolitical strategic interest. Looking at the events leading
up to the Rwandan genocide, we find an international community that was unreceptive to
the genocide‟s early warning signs. The position exhibited by the international
community from the very beginning conditioned all levels of “activities” surrounding this
situation. As one of the most significant events to take place in the immediate wake of
the Cold War‟s end, it represented the international community‟s unwillingness to act
because it served no direct state interest and also lacked precedent regarding genocide
prevention/ humanitarian intervention to serve the common good.
The findings of the Report of the Independent Inquiry on the 1994 genocide in
Rwanda were that the United Nations and its member states lacked political will,
resources and direction. From the beginning, the UNAMIR was doomed to failure as its
creation lacked the right intentions and inefficiencies. For one thing the United Nations
via the Secretary General, Security Council, DPKO and other organs of the United
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Nations, and the member states set the UNAMIR mission and the Rwandan population up
for failure.
The international community failed to take into account the country‟s history with
ethnically motivated massacres. Significant ethnically based discrimination, violence and
propaganda were present in the early 90s. The early warning signs should have been seen
by UN officials, DPKO officials, and other parties involved in establishing UNAMIR‟s
objectives, scope and goals. This failure is significant as it indicated a failure to
understand the dominant social structures of the state and ignored the reality on the
ground. Further, the international community failed to provide the reconnaissance
mission which was sent to Rwanda to establish the Neutral International Force (NIF) with
a report submitted by the Special Rapport of the Commission on Human Rights, Mr.
Waly Bacre Ndiaye. The report specifically pointed out the likelihood that genocide was
taking place and as such should have drawn the attention of the Secretary General,
Security Council, signatories to the Genocide Convention, and UN organs involved in the
country. Yet the report was largely ignored and the information failed to inform the
creation/formation and work of UNAMIR. Furthermore, the findings resulting from Mr.
Ndiaye‟s visit to Rwanda from April 8-17, 1993 could have allowed Brigadier-General
Romeo A. Dallaire‟s reconnaissance mission to better gauge the situation on the ground
and ask for the appropriate number of troops. It would have allowed the UNAMIR, once
established in Rwanda, to better assess their operations and take appropriate actions when
extremist activities threatened the mission‟s goals. As the report argues, “the planning
process failed to take into account remaining serious tensions which had not been solved
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in the agreement between the parties.”21 The failure to communicate important
information regarding the human rights situation to Dallaire‟s mission prohibited
UNAMIR from addressing the full scope of the Rwandan conflict and framing
developments within the country accordingly.
Additionally, once reliable information was made available to the UN
peacekeepers, the international community treated such information with disinterest.
Romeo Dallaire‟s cable to the DPKO illustrates the wealth of information available to the
United Nations and international community when it comes to active engagement in
genocide prevention. In this case information was not shared with high level officials
who were better able to gauge the totality of the situation and/or take effective action to
halt the violence. Dallaire‟s failure to include the Under-Secretary-General for
Peacekeeping and Political Affairs in his cable greatly limited his audience and the
support he strongly needed. Further, the DPKO‟s refusal to bring the deteriorating
situation to the attention of the Secretary General and Security Council, and its decision
to opt to respond so tepidly paved the way for Hutu extremist actions. By failing to take
real action and share information with officials able to do something, the international
community limited its options. Interestingly enough, DPKO‟s claims that actions taken
by Dallaire‟s forces were in violation of the rules of engagement were faulty because
Dallaire‟s Rules of Engagement for UNAMIR drafted on November 23, 1993 never
elicited a response from Peacekeeping Operations officials.
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In many respects what is arguably the international community‟s failure in the
lead-up to and throughout the Rwandan genocide was very consistent with attitudes at the
time. The truth is that there was a general interest in avoiding situations that would have
strained resources, and committed troops and finances to a situation which did not
provide an easy answer. Because a significant number of states viewed UNAMIR as a
symbolic gesture they conditioned the mission‟s funding and continued support on its
immediate success. As a result they communicated to officials within the UN body what
types of information was welcomed. By threatening to defund and eliminate missions
that were not immediately successful or which evolved in ways inconsistent with member
states‟ demands, they narrowly defined peacekeeping operations in the 1990s and forced
officials directly involved with the Rwandan situation to edit information which
threatened the continued livelihood of UNAMIR. Further, in the absence of any prior
precedent or norm regarding human rights or genocide prevention that might propel the
international community into action for the common good, Rwanda was doomed.
Taking a look at the planning process for UNAMIR we constantly encounter
problems regarding the international community‟s position. First there were divergent
opinions on the number of troops needed for the mission, with the Arusha delegation
requesting a troop size of 4,260, and the Secretary General identifying a troop force of
2,548.22 The international inquiry report indicates that throughout the planning process
states expressed an interest in reducing the troop force required. As the report argues:
This picture of the political commitment at the time was
probably correct: the United States delegation had
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suggested to the United Nations that a symbolic presence of
100 be sent to Rwanda. Even France, which had pushed
for a United Nations presence in Rwanda, felt that 1,000
would suffice.23
The bartering among member states about the troop size for the UNAMIR mission
represented both a naive oversimplification of the situation in Rwanda and a general lack
of political will to expend resources.
As the March 14, 1994 report by the Security Council “Improving the Capacity of
the United Nations for Peacekeeping” indicated, there was a significant growth in
demands for UN peacekeeping operations which were increasingly constrained by the
decreasing financial and moral support to carry out these types of missions.
The findings of the Independent Inquiry into of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda
show that UNAMIR was sidelined by the evacuation practices of France, Belgium, the
United States and Italy,24 that it suffered from significant infighting among contributing
member states,25 and that the disbanding and evacuation of the police command
significantly constrained the strength of the troops already on the ground from responding
as a unified front.
The international community‟s rhetoric toward the Arusha delegation and
UNAMIR mission emphasized withdrawal and minimal engagement. This rhetoric
conditioned how information was distributed throughout the UN bodies and how
information was shared from UNAMIR reports, and also limited the inclusion of all
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possible options available to respond to the heightened situation. As the report correctly
argues:
the instinctive reaction within the Secretariat seems to have
been to question the feasibility of an effective United
Nations response, rather than to actively investigate the
possibility of strengthening the operation to deal with the
new challenges on the ground.26
The death of 800,000 Tutsis and 200,000 sympathizers was truly a moral failure
for the international community. Fifteen years later we are able to see where constructive
engagement could have taken place. We are also able to praise a number of NonGovernmental Organizations (NGOs) and individuals for saving thousands of lives and
staying behind as the world stepped back and watched. The Rwandan genocide stands as
a testament to the refusal to address problems from the outset of tense situations, to
bureaucratic obstructions, poor allocation or use of resources, a lack of political will and
the repercussions of a non-existent response. As a result of the international
community‟s failure to respond to the Rwanda crisis violence spread to Burundi, Zaire,
and the Democratic Republic of Congo. As Gerard Prunier argues, the tensions that
sprang from the Rwandan conflict boiled over and had debilitating effects throughout the
sub-Saharan region.27 The Rwandan genocide erased the notion that a “symbolic” act is
better than nothing. As member states stressed their own individual interest over the
common good, they eroded the integrity of their work and wasted resources.
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CASE STUDY 2: BOSNIA
THE HISTORY OF THE FORMER FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA
Born of different national identities and experiences with both the Hapsburg and
Ottoman Empires, the six republics and two autonomous provinces which constituted the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were an unlikely and awkward constellation of states.
With the end of the Second World War the republics of Yugoslavia were united under the
decisive leadership of Josep Broz Tito. Under the slogan “Brotherhood and Unity” Tito
centralized government and impeded the nationalist tendencies of the various republics
until his death in 1980. With “blood soaked hands” Tito reined in ancient ethnic
tensions.28 However, with his death the Republics of Yugoslavia was tossed into
upheaval as a lack of forward planning by the enigmatic leader gave way to nationalistic
tendencies and economic disintegration.
As Leslie Benson argues, the Yugoslav project under Tito‟s leadership was able
to persist because Western economic aid which utilized Yugoslavia‟s geopolitical
position to counter the threat of the Soviet bloc allowed Yugoslavs to live well beyond
their means. In reality, Benson argues that Tito‟s never fully dealt with the reality of
Yugoslav socialist democracy because: 1) “„market socialism‟ never existed, and 2)
„Direct Democracy‟ was always a slogan.”29 Moreover, an incredible debt was amassed
during Tito‟s rule identified at US$20.5 billion by 1983, causing the average standard of
living to drop by 30 percent, consumer prices to drop by 36 percent annually and average
incomes to drop by two thirds.30 With the disintegration of the USSR and the fall of the
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Berlin Wall, the Yugoslav Republics were left isolated with a huge debt as western aid
dwindled because their geopolitical importance diminished.
A decade after Tito‟s death a younger generation of leaders with national ties
started coming to power. In place of Tito‟s leadership the eight man state presidency,
installed in 1979, which rotated power among the various republics, was utilized by each
president to further the overall economic interest of his respective state. The tension
inherent in such a system was not felt until the full collapse of the Soviet state. In the
wake of the death of Tito the republics of Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, BosniaHerzegovina, Macedonia, Slovenia and the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and
Kosovo became a hotbed of conflict over land, resources and power.
As the first real sign of the intent of the Serbian people to finally re-establish their
ancestral homeland, a 1986 draft Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and
Arts charged that a conspiracy against Serbian nationalism by the Yugoslav leadership
had divided Serbia into three nations for the good of the Federation, and that genocide
was being committed by Kosovo against the Serbs within the territory.31
Under a banner of ethnic unity Slobodan Milosevic heard the voices of the
Serbian people and tried to unify Serbians throughout the various Yugoslav republics,
calling upon the ancient efforts of their ancestors. According to Benson, “the Serbs were
backwoods men, easy meat for nationalist demagogues like Radovan Karadzic and
Milosevic, who milked the ideology of the peasant folks, offering them paternalistic
reassurance that they had not been forgotten.”32 His attempts to fulfill Serbian unity
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caused great tensions among the Former Yugoslav republics as one by one Slovenia,
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina took steps toward independence.

THE RISE OF THE BOSNIAN STATE
The disintegration of the Federation of Republics of Yugoslavia was a slow but
catastrophic event as Slovenia, Croatia and then Bosnia-Herzegovina would break away.
On October 15, 1991 the Bosnian Republican Assembly proclaimed the sovereignty of
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Worry arose as Muslim nationalism caused great unease to the
Bosnian Serbian minority. The catalyst for the Bosnian- Serbian conflict was the March
1, 1992 killing of a father of the groom by a Muslim man. Immediately Bosnian Serbs
erected barricades. Radovan Karadzic, the leader of the Bosnian Serbs declared: “I warn
you, you‟ll drag Bosnia down to hell. You Muslims aren‟t ready for war- you could face
extinction.” 33
The international community faced great difficulty in crafting an effective plan to
stem the violence and save the lives of countless people. Two weeks after the outbreak
of violence, the European Community (EC) held a conference in Lisbon suggesting the
division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into ten self- regulating provinces along ethnic lines.
The plan was immediately rejected by Bosnian president Alija Izetbegovic. Upon his
return from the meeting, President Alija Izetbegovic was captured and held by the
Yugoslav Federal Army until the United Nations was able to broker an exchange for
Yugoslav Federal Army Commander, Milutin Kukanjac.
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In the wake of the disintegration of the Yugoslav states, Serbia and Croatia
secretly agreed to carve up Bosnia-Herzegovina along ethnic lines, with no consideration
of the Bosniaks, Bosnian Muslim populations. The land grab by both Croatia and Serbia
preyed on the multiethnic Bosnian population and its military weakness. On March 27th
Bosnian Serbs declared their own independent republic, Republika Srpska. Serbia‟s
President Milosevic funneled Serbian troops and Yugoslav Federal army troops into
Bosnian Serb military forces and used them as proxies. According to Borisav Jovic,
President of the Yugoslav State Council and Special Advisor to Milosevic, the two
provided Bosnian Serbian 50- 80,000 troops, and strategic financial and military
assistance. 34 The Serbian troops took over land along the Serbian border and those
territories which held large Serbian populations. As in their campaigns against Slovenia
and Croatia, Serbia president Slobodan Milosevic united Serbs in the name of an ethnic
banner, resulting in the Bosnian Serbs gaining 70 percent territory the height of the
conflict. A few months later Croats in western Herzegovina proclaimed the state of
Herceg-Bosna.
Bosnian president Alija Izetbegovic met with Karadzic to find a solution to the
problem. Izetbegovic left the Bosnian Serbs in their territories due to his army‟s inability
to suppress the uprising. Bosnia was reduced to the Sarajevo- Tuzla- Travnik triangle in
central Bosnia and saw the flight of 1.5 million Bosnians, the creation of detention
camps, killing centers, mass rapes, torture, and destruction of Islamic cultural artifacts. 35
In April 1992, General Assembly resolution 46/ 237 admitted the Bosnia-Herzegovina
republic into the United Nations. By May the United Nations took steps to extend the
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mandate of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), originally established in
Croatia to “ensure demilitarization of designated areas… to support the delivery of
humanitarian relief, [and] monitor no fly zones [and] safe areas."36

THE BOSNIAN GENOCIDE
Amid western reluctance thousands of Muslims sought refuge in Srebrenica, a
province southeast of the Bosnian Capital of Sarajevo. Bosnian Serbs tried to starve their
enemies and force them into submission by constant bombing. While western powers
were reluctant to directly intervene in the conflict, bodies within the United Nations tried
to address the massacres being carried out in Muslim- dominated communities and in
Srebrenica more specifically. Venezuelan Diego Arria, chair of the UN Non-Aligned
Bloc, urged some action arguing that “when you see the… massacres that are occurring at
such… magnitude and the precedent that this sets for the rest of the world…eh… our
conscience is of grave moral authority to talk about these matters.”37
Resolution 819 identified Srebrenica as a safe area, which obliged the UN to deter
attacks on the Muslim town. As a stipulation for his acceptance of the resolution,
Bosnian Serb Commander Ratko Mladic required the United Nations to persuade the
Muslims to surrender their weapons, a condition the Bosnian Army accepted upon the
urging of General Philippe Morillon, Commander of the United Nations Forces in
Bosnia, and the promise of Canadian troops. “But since the UN had no means to defend
or supply them, they were anything but safe, and the shepherding of Muslims into these
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enclaves did the work of ethnic cleansing for the Serbs, putting them all tidily into a
demilitarized limbo for later mopping up.”38 Added to the list of safe areas were
Sarajevo, Gorazde, Zepa, Tuzla and Bihac.
Two attempts at peace made by Lord Carrington and Lord Owen of Britain failed
because western countries viewed the conflicts in the Balkans as irresolvable. Reflecting
this sentiment, Lord Owen warned Bosnians: “don‟t… don‟t… don‟t… live under this
dream that the west is going to come in and sort this problem out don‟t dream dreams.”39
Two United States administrations stood by as the slaughter in Bosnia went on. Both US
Secretary of State James Baker (May1992) and Warren Christopher (January 1994)
argued that the United States was in no condition to get involved in the Bosnian problem
because they could not police the world.
Several months later the Vance- Owen plan attempted to negotiate peace by
proposing that Bosnia‟s administration be shared among Croats, Serbs, and Bosniaks
through the establishment of ten self governing provinces. The plan was rejected by the
Bosnian Serb Assembly by a majority vote of five to one, upon Mladic‟s description of
the extent of land loss and the unfavorable terms of the plan for the Serbian population if
it was accepted.
By June 1995 Bosnian commanders had found little value in Srebrenica as they
saw a general reluctance by the international community to fulfill their promise to fully
commit to the UN safe zone. In retaliation for Muslims‟ attack on a Serbian village,
Serbs decided to fight back and take hold of Srebrenica. In the midst of the attacks
thousands of Bosnian Muslims ran into the fields where Bosnian Serb soldiers were
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waiting for them. By the 12th of July 1995 well over 25,000 Muslims had run to the UN
base in Srebrenica.40 As Muslim women, children and elderly were being caravanned out
of the area, well over 8,000 Muslim men were executed. Dr. Ilijav Pilav, a Srebrenica
citizen, recalled that “life in Srebrenica was hell but what we went through on that
journey that was the ninth circle of hell.”41 The international community stood by as
these attacks were carried out. Aid did not arrive to the desperate Bosniaks until August
1995 when NATO finally launched airstrikes in response to the repeated bombing of
Sarajevo‟s marketplace.
A ceasefire was viewed as unfavorable to the Bosnian Serbs but was achieved
upon the influence of His Holiness Patriarch Pavle, the Serbian Orthodox leader who
urged the adoption of the agreement.42 The Contact Group, composed of the United
States, Britain, Russia, France and Germany, tried to induce Serbians to sign a peace
agreement and establish land sharing between the Muslim-Croat Federation and Serbians
by giving each 51 percent and 49 percent respectfully. By October 1995 a ceasefire had
been agreed to by all parties and in late October peace talks took place in WrightPatterson US airbase in Ohio. The Dayton Peace Accord was formally signed on
November 21, 1995. The Dayton Agreements, signed on December 14, 1995 lifted the
arms embargo and signaled the end of the Bosnian conflict.
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ASSESSMENT
The disintegration of the Federal Republics of Yugoslavia was a slow and catastrophic
event. As the states of Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia,
Slovenia and the independent provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo evolved into a hotbed
of conflict in the 1990s, the international community again played witness to genocide.
As Yugoslavia disintegrated, with deaths resulting from policies of ethnic cleansing and
an episode of genocide, the violence exhibited by all sides of the conflict attracted major
actors on the international stage and once again tested their commitment to the Genocide
Convention.
The massacres of Bosnian males in July 1995 at the United Nations safe area of
Srebrenica, one of six United Nations designated safe areas, was the largest mass murder
to take place in Europe since the Holocaust.43 The international community played an
active role in the conflict, expending time and resources to try to bring an end to the
conflict and restore peace to the region. But, failures in planning and wavering
commitment spelled doom for thousands. The bodies of approximately 8,000 male
Bosniaks littered the fields surrounding Srebrenica yet again signaled a major failure for
the international community.
The Bosnian conflict may have succeeded in drawing greater aid and support
from a full spectrum of the international community, as compared to the Rwandan crisis,
yet the severity of the conflict greatly tested the international community‟s resolve. This
time a lack of precedence and resolve undermined the work of UNPROFOR. As early
warning signs were ignored and aggressors underestimated the response mechanisms
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meant to deter the violence UNPROFOR was encumbered by a faulty chain of command
and administrative inefficiencies and formalities.
As nationalism revived in the wake of Tito‟s death, the disintegration of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia erupted into a mobile, ethnically motivated, dirty war.
Burned villages, ethnic cleansing, rape, executions, forced relocations, bombings, and
other tactics were used by all sides in order to lay claim to land or power. Activities of
this nature were increasingly a common part of the Bosnian-Serb-Croat conflict. As the
November 1999 report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution
53/35 points out, well over 1 million people were displaced and tens of thousands died in
the wake of Serbian conquest.44
The violence attracted the attention of the European Community (EC), United
Nations (UN), Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Organization of the Islamic Conference
(OIC). Such wide spread knowledge of the commonality of violence in Bosnia drove the
international community to commit air support, a UN troop size of 30,000, and hold a
number of conferences to broker peace. Additionally, the international community
dabbled with the creation of safe zones meant to provide shelter for Bosnian Muslims and
assisted in the distribution of humanitarian aid. But, the international community balked
as differing opinions on the appropriate course of action failed to give clarity to the work
of UNPROFOR. The Commander of UNPROFOR noted that there was “a fantastic gap
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between these resolutions, the will to execute these resolutions, and the means available
to commanders in the field.”45 As Yashushi Akashi argued:
with a consensus absent in the Council, lacking strategy,
and burdened by an unclear mandate, UNPROFOR was
forced to chart its own course… thus choos[ing] to pursue a
policy of relatively passive enforcement.46

As UNPROFOR opted to adopt a passive enforcement policy in order to meet the
most minimal requirements of the Security Council members, it was doomed for failure.
The Bosnian case makes clear that there was a significant gap between the rhetoric which
was coursing through the United Nations and its member states and its application on the
ground.
The international community‟s attempts to broker peace among the warring
parties were greatly undermined by their propensity to appease aggressors. The clearest
example of this failure was in their policies regarding the UN safe zones. By catering to
the Serbian‟s demands for the disarmament of the population in order to allow for the
establishment of the UN safe zones and the granting of administrative control of these
zones to Serbs, they carelessly placed a whole population in a very vulnerable situation.
The international community continued a policy of appeasement as Serbians grew more
and more aggressive and unwilling to compromise. The Serbian‟s growing
confrontational stance and rebellious nature should have been good warning signs of the
need to bulk up protection of UN safe zones.

45

United Nations General Assembly, 54th Session. Report of the Secretary General pursuant to General
Assembly resolution 53/35. “The Fall of Srebrenica.” Supp. 549 (A/54/549). Official Record. New York,
1999, pp. 32.
46
Ibid, pp. 16.

55

The Secretary General‟s report argues that Serbian troops were well equipped
compared to their UN counterparts who suffered from a lack of resources, technology and
equipment. Serbia‟s aggressive position in Gorazde, Bihac, and Srebrenica during July
6-11 went unaddressed or punished by NATO or UN forces. The reality of the bloody
massacres, arms embargo and the demilitarization of the Srebrenica safe area highlight
the fact that the conditions which greatly limited the ability of Bosniaks to protect and
defend themselves should have been factored in as the UN passively handed over the
Srebrenica enclave.
According to the report Serbs had between 1-2,000 soldiers, tanks, armored
vehicles, mortar and artillery.47 Further, they kept the Srebrenica safe zone hostage for
three months prior to the genocide, and restricted the passage of supplies and equipment.
In the immediate lead- up to the genocide Serbs fired directly at UN forces. Further, as
the Serbian troops were within kilometers of the enclave, the UN troops chose to
negotiate instead of defend. Their practices show a severe reluctance to step back and
fully acknowledge the reality on the ground.
As a result of spats among UN and NATO personnel over control of the NATO
air force, an unclear chain of procedures emerged that resulted in a number of Dutchbat‟s
(the battalion in charge of protecting the Srebrenica safe zone) request in the lead- up to
the genocide going unnoticed. The most glaring failure was experienced as a result of a
three hour delay between the registering and processing of the request of Dutchbat three
for air support by Force Command and NATO Liaison Officers. This failure resulted in
greater delays in assistance as air support was forced to return to base for refueling. On
47
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various occasion on the morning of July 11th Dutchbat‟s request did not go on record and
did not reach the leadership in Zagreb and Sarajevo. Another significant failure was the
lack of information sharing with the leadership of the United Nations Peace Force
(UNPF) and other key officials. Bodies within the United Nations were given inaccurate
and misleading information.
As a result of failures committed in the early days of the genocide, an appropriate
response was greatly limited. By appeasing Serbian aggressors, failing to acknowledge
the bloody nature of the conflict, clearly defining the work of UNPROFOR, and
establishing clear and effective procedures, an appropriate response was out of the
question. Further, the severest failure by the international community was their blind
handover of Srebrenica without ensuring the complete protection of inhabitants or their
transfer to other safe zones. They failed to ensure the safety of those entrusted to their
care and their refusal to allow Bosniaks to arm in self defense ensured their death.
The Bosnian genocide drew the attention of the international community as they
established a UN peacekeeping force of 30,000 troops, the creation of safe zones and
continued attempts toward a peace agreement. The extent to which the international
community was willing to try to establish a number of safe areas in the midst of the war
highlights the growing interest of the community in protecting a people greatly battered.
Yet their work was plagued with a lack of direction, administrative inefficiency and lack
of international resolve. As the largest genocide to occur on the European continent since
the Holocaust it was a startlingly call to our conscience. The massacre of approximately
8,000 Bosnian Muslim military age males requires us to visit the engagement of war
along ethnic lines and re-evaluate dominant attitudes and practices.
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CASE STUDY 3: DARFUR
The Darfur case is not officially considered genocide because the genocidal intent has
not been present within the central Sudanese government and the violence has not been
directed to the legally defined protected groups. However, it does serve as an exemplar
case. Darfur‟s lack of definitional cohesion within the legally accepted framework does
not mean that it does not represent a systemic use of violence against a population that
sees and is seen within its own society as different or “other.” It took a significant toll on
the targeted populations and had spillover costs in the form of Internally Displaced
Persons (IDPs) and the presence of a large refugee population in neighboring Chad.
More importantly the backdrop of a North-South conflict that has plagued Sudan since its
independence and the January 2011 referendum which has granted the oil rich south the
right to secede from Khartoum has aggravated the situation. Its inclusion is further
supported by the fact that the United Nations, the African Union, the United States, and
the public agree on its relevance.

THE HISTORY OF TWO SUDAN
Sudan is described as a country of two halves. Like many British colonies, Sudan
exemplifies the repercussions of colonial practices which reinvented identity. According
to Mahmood Mamdani, “Arabism” within Sudanese society has taken on a varied
significance.48 Arabism has evolved to encompass a cultural movement, a linguistically
useful organizing tool as well as a strategic political mechanism. Julie Flint argues that
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identity with in Sudan has been of a transitory nature, highly dependent on the context.49
However, even within this reality the North and the Khartoum government have played
an instrumental role in how Sudanese identity has translated into significant structural
realities. Northern Sudan has viewed Arabism as a source of pride and status, evolving it
to signify an avenue for power and international allegiance. In essence as Khartoum has
tried to remake Sudanese society and shake off years of discontent, its „arabization‟ of
Sudan through policies enacted has escalated tensions.
The Khartoum government has long been disconnected from its people. It has
been reluctant or unable to overcome economic and political injustice. As Douglas H.
Johnson argues, Sudan experienced a decline in its agricultural output and annual growth
rate of exports and experienced a rise in its annual balance of payments during the
1980s.50 Additionally, the eventual failure of the Addis Ababa Agreement which had
established peace between the North and the South and the dismissal of the Regional
Assemblies which distributed power among the various regions, limited the autonomy of
the peripheral regions educational and economic planning. Further, economic disparities
as a result of the government‟s unequal distribution of wealth and resources and the
combined effects of the previously mentioned conditions brewed discontent among the
populace. However, the Sudanese government opted for “appeals to Islam and PanArabism… used by parties of the centre to overcome the discontent of marginality.”51
Khartoum‟s 1989 decision to redefine Sudanese society as a pure Arab/ Islamic
society has had a disastrous effect. By failing to construct a national identity that
49
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reconciles the differences between the racial and religious identities of its people and
address the inequalities and injustices that have bred displeasure, it has pushed the
country into a bloody battle. Sudan‟s push toward an Arab/Islamic Sudanese identity
only fuels already existing disdain at the economic disparities between the North and the
greatly marginalized rest of the country. It has utilized identity to circumvent real
leadership and problem solving.
In May 2000, The Black Book: Imbalance of Power and Wealth in Sudan
published by the Justice and Equality Movement, a rebel group, was distributed
throughout the country.52 The book documented how individuals originating from three
northern tribes that represented only 5.4 percent of the country‟s overall populations
controlled a significant distribution of political and economic power.53 It highlighted the
tribes‟ control over the presidency, and dominance “in the police and military hierarchy,
the judiciary, provincial administrations, banks and developmental schemes.”54

THE VIOLENCE
Amidst the North- South bloody war and division within the Khartoum
government, rebellion spread throughout Darfur, the western region of Sudan. Darfuri
rebels went public on February of 2003 seeking the implementation of development
programs and greater equality and recognition. “On March of 2003, the rebels seized the
garrison town of Tine on the Chad border and captured huge stocks of arms and
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equipment.”55 In response the Khartoum government took a strict stance with the rebels
as they felt the pressure to present a strong front vis-a-vis the already raging conflict with
the South. In what they argue was a counterinsurgency campaign the government
utilized the Janjaweed, an Arab militia composed of looters on horseback, to conduct a
scorched earth campaign on hundreds of Darfur villages in an attempt to weed out the
rebels. The Sudanese government coordinated the rearmament reinforcement, and use of
air support for the Janjaweed in exchange for their services.56 As a cheap method of
counterinsurgency the group was granted immunity for their raids, murder, and rape of
thousands of women.
By early April a joint partnership among the military forces and Janjaweed
attempted to put down the rebellion and in the process targeted villages they believed
supported some of the rebel forces. In response, 317 rebels in thirteen vehicles drove off
to the Kutum air base and destroyed seven military planes, killed 70 military personnel
and acquired a stock pile of weapons.57
Viewing the unraveling conflict and the tenacity of the rebellion, the government
stuck to its position instead of trying to meet the developmental needs of the region.
They armed Arabs in the region as a counter measure yet quickly lost control of the
populace as greed pushed many to target Fur and Masalit tribes. In a communication
with the Western Area Commander, Musa Hilal, a Janjaweed militia leader, reiterated
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that “you are informed that directives have been issued … to change the demography of
Darfur and empty it of African tribes.”58
In March 2004 a series of massacres were carried out as Janjaweed, armed with
lists, rounded up hundreds of “rebels” from their homes.59 According to Flint and de
Waal, “the UN estimated that between 700 and 2,000 villages were totally or partially
destroyed.”60 As a result of the attacks by the government- supported militia the death
toll of a number of nomadic African tribes in the Darfur region was approximated at
300,000 with more than 3 million made homeless, and untold number of rapes.61 As Flint
and De Waal argue, “in the subsequent debate over whether the war in Darfur constituted
genocide or not … one thing is certain: the people who decided to use ethnic militias as a
counter-insurgency force knew exactly what it would mean.”62
While information regarding the growing violence against nomadic African tribes
in the Darfur region of Sudan was brought to the attention of the international community
as early as late 2003- early 2004, a number of key officials ignored the conflict in favor
of the North-South peace process which was to put an end to the bloody civil war. Much
like what was seen in Rwanda and Bosnia before, those with the information about the
ensuing violence failed to share this information with key officials early in the conflict.
Such information failed to arrive to the ears of civil society and key officials until a
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frustrated UN official went live on the BBC denouncing the violence and the lack of
international attention.63
In his address during the 10th anniversary of the Rwandan genocide, then
Secretary-General Kofi-Annan (1997- 2006) noted the urgency of the Darfur conflict and
pressed for action. An African Union troop contingent sent in 2004 in an attempt to
broker a peace agreement lacked resources and international support. NATO would
participate in the training and transporting of African Union troops during 2004-2007 in
an attempt to strengthen the AU‟s peacekeeping operations capacity. Four Security
Council resolutions discussing the Darfur conflict passed by the Security Council during
2004 were accompanied by no real action to halt the violence. According to Frontline,
the international community‟s unwillingness to act assertively resulted in 6,000 new
deaths for each month the conflict went unchecked.64 Seven UN resolutions were passed
in 2005, and an additional eight in 2006 before the international community finally
mobilized.
In 2007, the Security Council finally passed resolution 1706 with a vote of 12:0:3.
The resolution which called for UN troops to be sent to Sudan to address the conflict was
weakened by the inclusion of a clause which made the troops‟ presence dependent on the
approval of the Sudanese government, a consent which was never given. However, this
missed opportunity did not last for long as civil society mobilized in large anti-genocide
demonstrations and began the “Genocide Olympics” campaign.65 They pressured their
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respective governments to address the Darfur crisis. In July 2007 Security Council
Resolution 468 establishing a UN peacekeeping troop of 26,000 was finally approved.

ASSESSMENT
The response to the Darfur conflict has been plagued by significant failures.
Political bargaining resulted in a delayed response from the international community.
The 2007 resolution establishing a UN peacekeeping presence in Sudan, three years after
the conflict began was a meager response and a disappointment to many. Ten years after
the Rwandan genocide, the international community repeated its faulty policies and let
civilian- targeted violence go unchecked. Nevertheless, while still an imperfect example
of humanitarian intervention, practices that have arisen in the immediate aftermath of the
violence follow a more calculated response to states obligations to prevent genocide and
other mass atrocities.
The initial failure of the international community was a result of its emphasis on
the North-South conflict and its desperate attempts to bring about peace. The
international community failed to take into account that the same conditions that bred
discontent in the south were also present throughout the country. Further, the habitation
of violence in the Sudanese conflict was not taken into account during its assessment of
the conflict.
When information regarding the growing violence in the Darfur region of Sudan
was brought to the attention of the international community, it went largely unaddressed.
Protected by the international community‟s failure to respond as a result of sovereignty
concerns, the Sudanese government was able to excuse the violence as a normal
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byproduct of events in a developing country. In fact the Sudanese government
manipulated information to downplay the violence within the region and stall any
progress.
While then United Nations Secretary- General Kofi Annan strongly advocated
action by member states, the conflict was placed on the backburner. Further, information
which was shared and made public did not elicit a response as a result of Sudan‟s
strategic value to the Chinese government. The establishment of a fact- finding
commission did not present the situation as a severe situation. While it succeeded in
reporting individuals linked to the violence to the International Criminal Court (ICC)
leading to the indictments of a number of individuals they did not press the international
community to get involved in halting the violence. With the involvement of NATO and
the EU early on, the African Union troops were able to receive training but were still
inadequately equipped for the burden of halting the violence.
It was not until civil society was made aware of the situation that sufficient
pressure was placed on leading governments to take a more forceful stance with the
Sudanese government. As the crucial catalyst for action due to their use of anti- genocide
demonstrations, international campaigns, the dissemination of information and lobbying
activities, civil society mobilized in significant ways to elicit states‟ action. The pressure
placed on governments by civil society helped force the hand of governments to act.
Additionally, the establishment of a hybrid United Nations- African Union
peacekeeping operation was a weak response as they came only after the death of
thousands and the reduction of violence within the region. However, with 22,061
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personnel and a budget of $1,808,127,500,66 it is one of the largest funded operations for
2010-2011. Through the work of the peacekeeping operations violence in the region has
been greatly reduced and a draft peace document was drawn up in September 2010.67
However, the UNAMID mission still faces many challenges in its path toward
establishing a lasting peace in Sudan.
While the death of 300,000 people, the displacement of millions, and the rape of
an untold number of women is a shocking reality that offends our moral sensibility,
recent activities are likely to be the first steps toward true prevention. What the Darfur
case tells us is that change is possible, yet the international community has only been able
to make progress in response to its glaring failures. It still continues to suffer greatly
from inactivity and political bargaining. The indictment of key officials like President
Omar al-Bashir, Minister of State for the Interior Ahmed Haroun and Janjaweed militia
leader Ali Kushayb as well as the establishment of a peacekeeping operation which has
taken a hybrid approach with considerable assistance from NATO are all significant and
promising practices.

CASE STUDY CONCLUSION
Missed opportunities can be found cutting across the case studies, speaking to
critical aspects of peacekeeping and genocide prevention. The Rwandan case study, for
example, illustrates how dominant political perspectives and a lack of commitment by
major actors hinder the potential success of all levels of genocide prevention. Srebrenica
falls along the same lines of discussion as the emerging and poorly formulated practices
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regarding UN Safe Zones and disarmament practices hindered peace. Moreover, the
Srebrenica incident highlights the failure of appeasement policies toward aggressors as a
significant threat to the international community‟s responsibility for peace and security.
The Darfur conflict also echoes some of the lessons learned in Srebrenica as
appeasement of the Sudanese government during the conflict resulted in a significantly
delayed response from the international community. Darfur highlights the gaps between
international rhetoric and the international community‟s propensity toward inactivity.
However the strongest lesson that can be drawn from the Darfur conflict is the important
role civil society can have in overcoming some of the international community‟s
bureaucratic and political inefficiencies.
Furthermore, communication and information sharing greatly hampered prospects
for success in both Rwanda and Bosnia, pointing to the importance of clear channels of
communication and command. In all three cases international actors failed to integrate
past history with ethnically based violence, and civil war to UN peacekeeping missions
and intervention. And key developments and genocidal plans were often ignored or
ineffectively addressed. For all of the case studies, political will hampered some if not all
levels of genocide prevention.
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CHAPTER 4: GENOCIDE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM MODELS
INTRODUCTION
In the pages that follow I will look at the current international practices on
genocide prevention and the changes made in light of the previous case studies. As the
case studies have exemplified, a slow but significant change has occurred within the
genocide regime: in particular, the introduction of verbal cues or “framing”1 from the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) and practices
within the United Nations structure have furthered genocide prevention.

EARLY WARNING AND MONITORING
Within the genocide studies field significant attention is paid to the factors
contributing to the outbreak of violence with only a marginal number of scholars actually
attempting to address its prevention. In recent years however, scholarly works have
produced models geared to detecting genocide‟s outbreak, monitoring and response.
Barbara Harff‟s Risk Assessment model consists of daily monitoring of some 70
indicators (political, demographic, economic and environmental) which are factored into
six categories resulting in the assignment of an overall score for each country. The
countries receive a yearly ranking based on their overall scores and are separated into
three risk levels. As a result of genocide‟s dynamic nature, Harff utilizes accelerators,
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de-accelerators and triggers to explicate the short term factors that contribute to
genocide‟s occurrence.2
Harff‟s accelerators and de-accelerators are “variables operationalized as events
that typically increase [or decrease] the level or significance of the most volatile of the
background and intervening conditions… often develop[ing] a momentum of their own
capable of escalating [or decreasing] a crisis.”3 Additionally, Harff utilizes triggers,
“significant single events whose occurrence is likely… to propel a crisis to the next phase
of escalation,”4 as the “tipping point” or catalyst to the outbreak of genocidal violence.
Because these factors are often short term events that can exacerbate or reduce the
tensions within a society, they add to the rankings and serve as an immediate reflection of
the situation on the ground. 5
Barbara Harff‟s structural risk assessment model‟s ability to identify long-term
structural factors or indicators that predict the likely onset of a genocide or politicide has
contributed to the assessment of developing situations. However, the model is labor
intensive, emphasizes macro-structural indicators, is time sensitive and costly, and so is
of limited utility to the international community. The use of accelerators, de-accelerators
and triggers limits timely action. As a result of her inclusion of politicides in her risk
assessment model, use of her model can be highly controversial and problematic. More
importantly, her model lacks the explanatory power needed by UN organs to mobilize
international action. It is however, the first of its kind to be utilized by the United States
Political Instability Task Force to predict escalating violence or instability.
2
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Steven C. Poe, Nicolas Rost and Sabine C. Carey‟s risk assessment model
represents one of the most inclusive models. In gearing their model toward early warning
and reporting of all humanitarian situations, they include a country‟s experience on six
dimensions (past repression, democracy, economic development, population size,
involvement in international or civil war)6 as well as its annual gross domestic product
(GDP) and population growth.7 The countries are then grouped into three categories
based on their likely human rights record.8
Poe, Rost and Carey‟s model is interesting and ambitious but is inundated with
information as a result of their attempts to be inclusive. Their findings do not translate
into accessible information for policymakers and so inhibits the ability to constructively
engage in genocide prevention. Furthermore, this model has not been articulated beyond
this article or implemented.
In 2004, Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated “that there can be no more
important issue and no more binding obligation than the prevention of genocide.”9 In
commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the Rwandan genocide, then SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan laid out his Five Point Action Plan to end genocide:
(a) preventing armed conflict;
(b) Protection of civilians in armed conflict including a
mandate for United Nations peacekeepers to protect
civilians;
(c) Ending impunity through judicial action in both
national and international courts;
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(d) Early and clear warning of situations that could
potentially degenerate into genocide and the
development of a United Nations‟ capacity to analyse
and manage information;
(e) And swift and decisive action along a continuum of
steps.10
Annan‟s five point plan served as the basis for significant activity within the United
Nations aimed at ending the occurrence of genocide.
Acting under Security Council resolution 1366 (2001), Annan created the Office
of the Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide (later changed to the Special
Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities, SAPG). The international
community‟s reception was mixed as some Member States viewed it as furthering
imperialist policies, while others saw it as the commitment to the responsibility to
protect.
The Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide (SAPG) was given the
mandate to:
(a) collect existing information, in particular from within
the United Nations system, on massive and serious
violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law of ethnic and racial origin
(b) act as an early warning mechanism to the SecretaryGeneral
(c) make recommendations to the Security Council on
actions to prevent or halt genocide and
(d) liaise with the United Nations system on activities for
the prevention of genocide.11
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The first Special Advisor, Juan Mendez, worked on a part-time basis to tackle the
difficult task of spearheading the United Nations genocide prevention agenda and
practices. Under his guidance the inner workings of the office‟s early warning system,
global risk assessment and communication practices were sketched out.
In an attempt to understand the nature of genocide then SAPG Juan Mendez
found linkages between genocide prevention and comprehensive action in the areas of:
(a) The protection of populations at risk against serious or
massive violations of human rights or humanitarian
law;
(b) the establishment of accountability for violations of
human rights and humanitarian law;
(c) the provision of humanitarian relief and access to basic
economic, social, and cultural rights; and
(d) the initiation and support of steps to address underlying
causes of conflict through peace agreements and
transitional processes12
The findings pointed to the need for fluidity in the United Nations short and long term
human rights work toward eliminating conditions conducive to genocide. The findings
were instrumental in molding how the Special Advisors office would assess possible
early warning systems and its own larger role in the United Nations.
Borrowing Woocher‟s definition, the SAPG defined early warning as:
The collection, analysis and communication of information
about escalatory developments in situations that could
potentially lead to genocide, crimes against humanity or
massive and serious war crimes, far enough in advance for
relevant UN organs to take timely and effective preventive
measures.13
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The SAPG views early warning as a crucial part of the operational and strategically
important preventive practices. The SAPG emphasized the role of member states and
tools at their disposal as crucial to the formulation of an effective early warning system.
Key to an effective system is timely information, based on immediate to medium term
indicators, in order to allow policymakers the time to strategically plan for specific
outcomes. The SAPG argued that allowing policymakers and UN organs to have early
engagement requires less political will and resources and entails fewer risk to the UN
Member States. Their work has reformulated how prevention is viewed and the risk and
costs associated with it.
The office of the SAPG, run at the time of writing Francis Deng, primarily utilizes
the Inter-departmental Framework for Coordination on Early Warning and Preventive
Action as a significant source of its information. The “Framework Team,” composed of
entities in the peace and security, development and humanitarian assistance sectors, is
seen as the ideal network within the United Nations structure to influence the Special
Advisor‟s work.14 The Special Advisor‟s office also utilizes reports by the Economic and
Social Council, Human Rights Council, Council on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination and a number of other organs of the United Nations for relevant
information as well as field operatives.
In exploring early warning systems the independence of the Special Advisor‟s
genocide early warning system was crucial. The Special Advisor‟s office evaluated early
warning and monitoring options based on a sense of credibility and independence from
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Member State influence. Among the models explored and rejected were Barbara Harff‟s,
Poe, Rost and Carey‟s, and Woolf and Hulsizer‟s. Woolf and Hulsizer‟s Psychosocial
Roots to Genocide Model argues that seven stages of violence are accompanied by seven
parallel processes. In Woolf and Hulsizer‟s model identification of legal/ political
practices which evolve into genocidal violence are products of psychosocial processes
that condition society‟s dehumanization and moral disengagement and exclusion of the
victim group (see table 4.1). A number of other models were rejected for their lack of
explanatory power. Most important to the SAPG‟s assessment however, was the possible
threat that information could leak before the office was able to address the conflict.

Table 4.1: Adaptation of Woolf and Hulsizer’s Psychosocial Roots Model
Levels of Violence

Psychosocial Processes

Hate Crimes and
Institutionalized Bias

Culture of Violence and
Ideology of Supremacy

Loss of Opportunity and
Privilege

Stigmatization

Loss of Civil Rights

Dehumanization

Isolation

Moral Disengagement

Loss of Human Rights

Moral Exclusion

Loss of Existence

Impunity

Denial

Perpetration of Violence

Source: Linda M. Woolf & Michael R. Hulsizer. “Psychosocial Roots of Genocide: Risk, Prevention, and
Intervention.” Journal of Genocide Research 7(1), (March 2005): 101-128.
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The 2005 World Summit Heads of States and Government pledged to assist the
United Nations with the establishment of an early warning capacity and stressed the role
of early warning in providing for “peaceful and preventive measures” and “a
differentiated assessment of the circumstances of each case.”15 The Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) has also made efforts to work toward the
elimination of genocide through its October 2005 Declaration on the Prevention of
Genocide and follow up report, Decision on Follow-up to Declaration on the Prevention
of Genocide: Indicators of Patterns of Systematic and Massive Racial Discrimination.
CERD has committed itself to working closely with the SAPG and has laid out 15
indicators of genocide. These indicators measure practices of dehumanization and
political disenfranchisement or exclusion that makes genocide possible. Additionally, the
Economic and Social Council‟s Commission on Human Rights published a March 2006
report on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, suggesting ways in which the
international community could address Kofi Annan‟s Five Point Plan toward ending
genocide.
In the years since the creation of the office of the SAPG, the office and the
international community have made advancements in formulating ways to prevent
genocide. In 2006 an Advisory Committee was created to assist the SAPG‟s work. Since
its inception the office has become part of the inter-departmental bodies of the Executive
Policy Committee, and Executive Committee on Peace and Security, among others. In
addition the office coordinates its work and information collection with the Department
of Political Affairs (DPA), the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
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(OHCHR), the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP), and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR), among others. Furthermore, it has trained UN personnel to examine
situations, based on their Analysis Framework, in order to assess the following
conditions:
1) Tense inter-group relations, including a record of
discrimination and/or other human rights violations
committed against a group;
2) Weak institutional capacity to prevent genocide, such as
the lack of an independent judiciary, ineffective
national human rights institutions, the absence of
international actors capable of protecting vulnerable
groups, and a lack of impartial security forces and
media;
3) The presence of illegal arms and armed elements;
4) Underlying political, economic, military or other
motivation to target a group;
5) Circumstances that facilitate perpetration of genocide,
such as a sudden or gradual strengthening of the
military or security apparatus;
6) Acts that could be elements of genocide, such as such
as killings, abduction and disappearances, torture, rape
and sexual violence, “ethnic cleansing” or pogroms or
the deliberate deprivation of food;
7) Evidence of the “intent to destroy in whole or in part”;
8) Triggering factors, such as elections.16
To strengthen their work the SAPG has linked the conditions found in the Analysis
Framework with international law in an attempt to “package[e] a diverse range of legal
provisions from different international legal instruments which, together, will provide
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detailed guidance on the range of legal provisions that need to be respected in order to
prevent genocide.”17

FLOW OF INFORMATION
The Special Advisor‟s position was upgraded in importance under the tenure of
Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, to the level of Under-Secretary-General and to a full
time commitment. Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon also created the Special Advisor on
the Responsibility to Protect, which receives guidance, and coordinates with, and reports
to the SAPG. As a result of its close working relationship with the Secretary-General the
Special Advisor‟s office is able to directly communicate critical information to the
Secretary-General and in turn to the Security Council. The access given to the SecretaryGeneral and the President of the Security Council allows for crucial information to be
disseminated quickly and for important situations to be placed on the UN‟s agenda.
Furthermore, as already described, its cooperative relationship with a number of UN
bodies allows for information sharing and coordination to take place in order to aid states
in resolving the conditions of conflict.
Security Council Resolution 1366, the resolution which serves as the basis for
SAPG‟s mandate, requests reports on “cases of serious violations of international law,
including international humanitarian law, and human rights law” and gives the Special
Advisor the ability to avoid some of the hardest questions regarding genocide prevention
and identification. In its inclusion of international humanitarian law and human rights
law the Security Council removed the power to “make a determination on whether
17
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genocide within the meaning of the convention had occurred”18 from the Special
Advisor‟s office. Instead the Special Advisor brings to the attention of the SecretaryGeneral and Security Council “any situation where identifiable groups were at risk of
mass-killing or other forms of destruction.”19 Such an expanded interpretation of cases
relevant to the SAPG‟s work is consistent with the wishes of the UN Member States
expressed in the 2005 World Summit Outcome document. Further, this led to the
inclusion of “Mass Atrocities” in the title of the office in 2007.
From the outset the Special Advisor‟s role was envisioned as behind the scenes or
employing “quiet diplomacy.”20 Yet while compatible with states‟ wishes, these
activities prohibit situations from being appropriately labeled genocide and thus binding
states to action. As a result dominant practices largely trap information on escalating
situations within the UN body. Situations that do not serve the interest of various
Security Council Members do not necessarily draw Member State condemnation or
international attention. The guarded way in which crucial information regarding volatile
situations within the UN organ is treated, limits civil society‟s engagement. It limits the
ability of civil society to fully comprehend international developments and to serve as an
internal pressure group to mobilize states to prevent genocide.
In recent years, civil society and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) have
increasing played a role in disseminating information regarding conflict and human rights
violations. In fact a number of UN organs have noted the important role civil society and
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NGOs have had in bringing about changes to humanitarian situations. Through the use of
YouTube, social media and other forums, knowledge has been disseminated in such a
way as to allow for civil society‟s empowerment. Non-governmental organizations such
as Human Rights Watch, International Crisis Group and the US Holocaust Memorial
Museum, for example, have played a role in informing the general public about
escalating situations. Via this forum, civil society is able to create international action
networks/campaigns. For example, significant civil society mobilization played a crucial
role in the eventual response to the Darfur conflict.

RESPONSE MECHANISMS
Linda M. Woolf and Michael R. Hulsizer‟s model already described identifies
seven stages of violence accompanied by seven parallel processes.21 These seven stages
and processes are then divided into four categories of responses. Their work, however,
remains significantly conceptual which does not provide real policy prescriptions.
Further, their primary prevention mechanisms is unrealistic because the seven stages
identified, in the levels of violence and the seven processes are so common that the
international community cannot connect all of them to a viable option. Gregory Stanton
and John G. Heidenreich commit similar errors in their stages of prevention.22
Benjamin A. Valentino argues that “because small groups can play such a central
role in causing mass killings… pre-existing cleavages, hatred and discrimination between
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groups, and non-democratic forms of government are of limited utility in distinguishing
societies at high risk for mass killing.”23 As a result he advocates a more targeted
response by the international community. According to Valentino responses to prevent
mass killings must “focus on disarming and removing from power the small groups and
leaders responsible for instigating and organizing the killings.”24 This approach most
closely resembles smart sanctions which focus on the travel and economic interest of
individuals involved with the genocide. As Adeno Addis argues sanctions serve an
ideational and instrumental role in international politics. Further, Addis argues that
“invoking a legal norm… is [done] to signal the boundaries of the community, to mark
publicly what is central to the identity of the community and what are the negations of
that identity.”25 However, the international community has double victimized civilians as
sanctioning practices have often failed to distinguish between the offending regime and
the state, resulting in economic stagnation, food shortages and other costly effects.
With the shift toward a responsibility to protect (R2P) the international
community has taken significant steps toward greater awareness of escalating situations
and employing a tempered preventive mechanism which views intervention as a last
resort. The United Nations and a number of the authors cited have placed emphasis on
exhausting all diplomatic, humanitarian and economic tools available before the use of
force is even considered.
Once information regarding human rights abuses is known, it is important that
policymakers take a mixed approach of pressure and diplomacy toward deterring the
23
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violence. Gareth Evans illustrates how such an approach can be adopted (see table 4.2).
He presents a mixture of structural and direct political, social, legal and security practices
that are intended to bring about change. A policy of pressure was exhibited by the United
States once details of the Darfur case became public. The US move to place an arms
embargo and economic sanctions on the Sudanese government are hallmarks of strong
diplomatic engagement. Not only does such an approach send a clear statement to the
given government that such abuses will not be tolerated but it reduces the resources made
available to the government to buy the weapons to carry out their plans.
Humanitarian approaches must be employed at the same time that such hard-line
positions are taken. By offering humanitarian aid, logistical or technological training and
favorable support for entry into a committee or organization, states can provide
incentives toward easing the violence. These activities however, must be mixed with
concessions made by the offending government toward reducing the human rights abuses.
Among the concessions needed for the supply of these favors is the need for UN
peacekeeping personnel or goodwill ambassadors to have access to the population to
gauge the reduction of tensions.
An interesting opinion voiced by Benjamin A. Valentino, is the need for
permissive emigration of the targeted population during genocide to reduce lives lost.
This position is a noble stance but with the significant destabilization of the sub-Saharan
region as a result of the spillover cost of the Rwandan genocide and Darfur crisis it is
hard to see how this practice would add to international peace and security.
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Table 4.2: Adaptation of Evan's Preventive Toolbox

Promote fair constitutional
structures
Promote human rights
Promote rule of law
Fight corruption

Legal dispute resolution
Threat of international criminal
prosecution

Security sector reform
Military to civilian governance
Confidence-building measure
Small arms and light weapons control

Preventive deployment
Non-territorial show of force
Threat of arms embargo or end of
military cooperation programs

Security

Aid conditionality
Threat of economic sanctions
Economic incentives

Legal

Support economic development
Support education for tolerance
Community peace building

Social

Direct
Preventive diplomacy
Threat of political sanctions

Political

Structural
Promote good governance
Promote membership into
international organization

Source: Gareth J. Evans.. The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All.
Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2009. p. 58.

The new concept, responsibility to protect, emphasizes the need to judge
intervention on whether actions taken are based on just cause. Evans and Sahnoun
emphasize the need to evaluate the decision to intervene on the principles of right
intention, last resort, proportionate means, and a reasonable prospect for success.26
According to Pattison, humanitarian intervention is a double-edged sword that can hurt or
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improve the UN‟s standing, as well as that of international law, weaken order and
destabilize and damage the doctrine of humanitarian intervention.27
A major failure that can be found in the responsibility to protect is that it leaves us
with the same exact problem we had before its inception. While R2P may have made the
walk up to the problem more interesting and vibrant, we still encounter the same
difficulties when intervention is discussed. Similar to its predecessor, humanitarian
intervention, it fails to give us an answer to who should intervene, with whose authority
intervention is undertaken with a banner of legitimacy and what are the constraints to
such an intervention.
James Pattison stresses the need to identify to whom claims regarding the
responsibility to react should be directed because this would prevent unnecessary delays.
In his evaluation Pattison argues that the actor with the most legitimacy based on the
likely effectiveness of its operations bears the duty of carrying out a humanitarian
operation to save lives. He argues that legitimacy does not necessarily entail full
legitimacy in order to carry out operations but that an adequate degree of legitimacy is
central to this work. In the end, he argues that an organization best situated to receive
internal and external consent from local and global actors and has the military capacity to
effect change would be most effective in carrying out military operations.28
In order to comply with international law, the resort to intervention/ use of force
must be authorized by the UN Security Council when possible. Pattison argues that when
legitimacy is “used in conjunction with humanitarian intervention, legitimacy is used to
mean that humanitarian intervention is legal, accepted by the international community,
27
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procedurally justified, authorized by the Security Council, and/or morally justifiable.”29
However, when this is not possible the Secretary General advises that the General
Assembly be used as a supplement to Security Council authorization. The SecretaryGeneral argues that “the General-Assembly may exercise a range of related functions
under Article 10 to 14, as well as under the “Uniting for Peace” process set out in its
resolution 377(V).”30 But, these are more optimistic views on getting a variety of states
with significant insecurities to consent to intervention. As Darfur exemplifies, states
have stood at quite different ends when it comes to intervention and state sovereignty.
The lag in response to the Darfur crisis was largely a result of different views of
sovereignty rights within the G-8 and within significant groupings of states. The
international community‟s emphasis on legality as opposed to legitimacy of intervention,
Pattison argues, is not the best course to ensure action. Action that is necessary though
not necessarily approved by the Security Council may be taken in exceptional cases.
From a policy perspective, Gary J. Bass argues that intervening states should
identify situations based on what he terms “spheres of humanitarian interest” and should
avoid direct confrontation with other great powers.31 Evans and Sahnoun advocate an
assessment of the intervention‟s feasible outcome. Orna Ben- Naftali argues that
assessment must look at:
(i) the geographical distance of the state concerned from
the scene of the events; (ii) the strength of the political and
other links between the state and the main actors in the
event; (iii) the state‟s legal position vis-à-vis the situation
29
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and the persons facing the danger or reality of genocide;
and (iv) the states level of awareness.32
Ben-Naftali places primary emphasis on the ability of the intervening state to influence
change within the given regime regarding the genocidal policy.
Furthermore, when intervention is to take place, restraint is a requisite for action.
John Janzekovic argues that intervention must have “clear political and strategic
directives, realistic mission goals and achievable military objectives before forceful
intervention should even be considered.”33 As Finnemore argues, intervention
increasingly depends on a multilateral approach.34 Further, interventions must be limited
to reducing the casualties and are not to affect the territorial integrity or political
independence of a state.

As the Brahimi Report highlights, it is crucial that UN

missions realistically access the likely outcome of actions in order to make sure that
missions are given a greater chance of success.
Regional and hybrid peacekeeping initiatives have increasingly become the norm.
Yet, a number of these regional organizations still lack the resources and logistical and
communication capacities to effectively enforce the peace. There have been a variety of
attempts to create standby military capacities. However, states have been inconsistent in
their rhetorical statements and their actual financial and resource contributions. As the
Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), United Nations Standby Arrangements
System (UNSAS), and United Nations Emergency Peace Service (UNEPS) indicates the
international community is still unprepared and unwilling to take such steps. A number
32
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of efforts to create a standby rapid deployment entity to carry out UN authorized forcible
intervention have been short lived as they have lacked the vision, leadership, and member
state support needed to make them a fixture in the international arena. In 2010 the
African Union would took steps to “operationaliz[e] Article 4 (H) of its Constitutive
Act”35 by establishing the African Standby Force. Additionally, there has been a growing
trend within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and among some developed
states to provide regional and institutional capacity building, transportation and logistical
support, peacekeeping training and equipment.
The poor record found in the genocides of the 1990s forced the United Nations to
conceptualize ways of deterring the crime while “recogniz[ing] and fully respect[ing] the
sovereignty of States.”36 Academic models give us innovative ways of looking at
genocide prevention, but they are incompatible with the resources and goals of the
international organizations capable of carrying out genocide prevention. Annan‟s Five
Point Plan was a catalyst for dramatic changes within the United Nations. With the
introduction of the idea of a Responsibility to Protect and the creation of the Office of the
Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide the international community finally had
the framework to examine and monitor ongoing conflict, disseminate information and
serve as a catalyst for action within the international system. Still, forcible intervention
lacked the proper framework needed to make it an ongoing feature of the international
system. The current practices exhibited by NATO, the US‟s Global Peace Operations
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Initiative (GPOI) and the AU‟s African Standby Forces may be an innovative approach to
carrying out forcible intervention to prevent genocide.

87

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
Since the international community committed to preventing and punishing the
crime of genocide more than 50 years ago, academics, policymakers, and lawyers have
expressed pessimism in their assessments regarding the community‟s commitment and
the likelihood of the realization of these goals. In an international system characterized
by its anarchic nature and the centrality of states in effecting the realization and progress
of a range of issues, human rights and human dignity have long struggled to find a proper
foot hold.
The work and goals of the human rights field express an ideal or moral
perspective of how the international system should be. Theorists have forwarded a view
of the rights, respect and opportunities that the world‟s community should be able to
enjoy. Yet at times those framing the discussion have talked about these ideals in ways
that are significantly inconsistent with states‟ will. The framing of human rights and
human dignity has often leaned toward a utopian ideal. A number of the academic
genocide prevention/response mechanisms imply Security Council reform, the creation of
independent standing military forces, the democratization of the world, the adoption of
open immigration policies and/or re-educating and sensitizing society. In many regards
some of the arguments are logical but still speak of reforms or practices that are not in
sync with the current international order. Furthermore, they will likely not be in sync for
at least the next ten years.
The discussion of human rights and human dignity has continuously conflicted
with the dominant international order or power distribution. In arguing for the reform of
the Security Council, for example, some scholars have ignored the interest of many states
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in maintaining the current international order. We have continuously framed progress in
these issue areas in ways which seem unrealistic to states and which conflict with how
they have come to understand their own identities and rights.
Human rights and human dignity have also conflicted with the ways in which we
have come to discuss state sovereignty rights. Human rights remains a highly
controversial topic which fails to find universality or acceptability among the over 190
states within the international system. A central problem is that the discussion of human
rights has moved the state from enjoying unbound rights to being responsible for
“services” to its citizens. At times human rights and dignity have been framed as a
burden on states, requiring states to ensure the enjoyment of rights that administratively
and structurally they are unprepared to provide. Other times the issue has been viewed as
an impingement of the integrity of the state‟s sovereign rights.
At the other end of the spectrum are dominant theories within the international
relations field that have taken a rather static and short term approach to human rights and
human dignity. These theories have emphasized the instant needs and wants of states
without taking a forward looking approach to the potential present in the current
international order to ensure that the conditions for long term stability and security are
met. Their emphasis on the immediate conditions and payoffs enjoyed by states has
increasingly failed to acknowledge the detrimental effects of mass violations of human
rights and conflict.
In the end dominant human rights theorists and international relations theorists
have spoken at different ends of the spectrum regarding these issues. The international
relations emphasis on the here and now and the human rights discussion of future ideals
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fail to honestly discuss what reforms and practices must be instituted to meet both of their
needs in the here and now. Bruce Cronin‟s International Protection Regimes (IPR)
attempts to overcome the stagnation that has immobilized the international community.
Cronin‟s emphasis is on the common good or international welfare that is at the heart of
“altruistic” human rights policy. Finnemore and Sikkink‟s discussion of the norms life
cycle helps us put developments into perspective and guides human rights theorists
working toward realizing their goals. All three of our case studies are testament to the
need for a wakeup call. The Rwandan genocide‟s origin in the ongoing conflict within
Burundi and its spillover into neighboring states forces us to reconsider the logic and
effectiveness of state centric assessments of human rights/ human dignity concerns.
Furthermore, the international community‟s rather inconsistent and meager track
record with regard to genocide and mass atrocities should not be the final verdict when it
comes to human rights and human dignity. Cutting across all three case studies are a lack
of political will, poor communication/ dissemination practices, and uncoordinated
responses. Yet there is a discernable change from case to case.
Without a doubt the Rwandan genocide was clearly an all out failure. In terms of
non-military intervention (such as economic sanctions, state pressure to halt the violence,
etc.), military intervention, and international condemnation there was no action. The
international community failed to take significant corrective action in the wake of the
genocide as states continued to reiterate their own interest in guiding policy. The only
moderate success originating from the conflict was the creation of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to prosecute crimes, which has helped clarify the
Genocide Convention.
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In contrast the Bosnian case study exhibits greater engagement and commitment
on the part of the international community. The European Community (EC), United
Nations (UN), Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)
were all involved in the conflict. The greater involvement of international organizations
meant that a more powerful and inclusive peacekeeping operation was organized. The
international community organized a number of conferences, meetings and peace plans in
an attempt to mediate the peace. The international community‟s introduction and
adoption of “UN Safe Zones” as an attempt to protect the civilian population was a moral
act. While failing to live up to the high expectations of their “altruistic” policies, the
international community‟s adoption of the UN Safe Zones was a significant step in a
conflict situation. Though they failed to properly formulate policy and practices for an
effective UN Safe Zone, their policies were representative of an ideal or moral good.
Further, the presence of military forces in the form of NATO air support was a significant
step forward from the total lack of action in the Rwandan conflict. Moreover, the
mandate of the peace keeping troops was more significant than in the Rwandan example.
However, if the progress seen in Bosnia was the barometer for the Darfur conflict,
the international community‟s engagement during the peak of the conflict can easily be
viewed as a failure. The international community ignored reports of the escalating
conflict within the Darfur region and failed to act to halt the violence. Yet the strength of
the Darfur case is without a doubt found in the years after. As the United Nations
struggled to pass a resolution which would allow for the rectification of the situation, the
African Union (AU) and NATO mediated the conflict during 2004-2007. A significant
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force in pressuring Security Council members to take a harsher stance with the Sudanese
government was civil society which has increased its links with the UN and other IOs.
Also, the United States and UN established their own independent inquiry on the
situation in Darfur in order to better understand the nature of the conflict. As a result of
the findings of the inquiry, referral of the Darfur case was made to the International
Criminal Court (ICC) and indictments of a number of individuals were issued. Three
men have been indicted thus far, President Omar al-Bashir, Minister of State for the
Interior Ahmed Haroun, and Ali Kushayb, a Janjaweed leader. The more targeted
approach to halting the violence was reflective of the lessons learned from previous
conflicts. Some states independently took action against the Sudanese government when
the UN Security Council was deadlocked by the opposition of China. Their use of
economic sanctions and public condemnation of the situation in Darfur served as signals.
When the Council was finally able to act, a hybrid United Nations- African Union
peacekeeping operation was created. This approach also reflected lessons learned by the
international community as practices were more sensitive and aware of the conditions of
the Sudanese society. Further, the use of a peace process as an integral part of the
peacekeeping operation, UNAMID, emphasized the long term nature of the resolution of
tensions.
Within the international system itself a discernible change is taking place as
genocide preventive measures are being embedded into the international structure. With
the move away from humanitarian intervention and the move toward a responsibility to
protect, the international community has moved away from emphasizing states‟ rights to
emphasizing states‟ responsibility. The introduction of a responsibility to protect has also
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bred a more open and richer understanding of intervention. The work of Gareth Evans
and Mohamed Sahnoun has placed a richer constellation of non-forcible intervention
measures, such as the use of economic sanctions, foreign aid assistance, and logistical/
technological/ or educational assistance, on the table for states‟ consideration. The ICISS
has spread out a responsibility to protect into three pillars: a “responsibility to protect,” a
“responsibility to react,” and a “responsibility to rebuild.” In doing so the ICISS has
allowed for the international community to work on resolving conflicts by seeing what
aspects of the concept are generally agreeable and what are not. In many regards, the
responsibility to protect is an example of Finnemore and Sikkink‟s norm cycle “framing.”
The creation of the Special Advisor‟s Office on the Prevention of Genocide
(SAPG) as part of the Secretary-General‟s office and its reports to the Security Council
ensures that escalating situations receive greater attention. As a result of its participation
within the “Framework” and its coordination with a number of UN offices, the SAPG is
able to translate awareness of situations into consistent approaches to diffusing tensions
and assisting states in meeting their responsibility to protect.
As a result of the Brahimi and New Horizon reports, UNDPKO has been able to
learn from its mistakes and more effectively and wisely carry out its peacekeeping
missions. The growing hybridity of peacekeeping operations, as exhibited in Darfur‟s
United Nations- African Union UNAMID mission, ensures that peacekeeping is more
sensitive and in tune with the states‟ needs/ nature. Other developments within the
international system are greater engagement with civil society and the use of the
International Criminal Court (ICC).
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Yet there is still work to be done. The UN system is still inadequately prepared to
collect and analyze information regarding conflict. In fact it lags behind a significant
number of member states in its ability to collect information. This reality is aggravated
by its need to remain neutral. It has increasingly failed to establish a clear hierarchy for
information sharing which would enable those with the ability to place pressure on
member states to receive such information on a timely basis. Furthermore, as a result of
its tendency to down play the role of the Special Advisor‟s office the UN has failed to
clearly communicate to its members what the office is intended to do. It has silenced the
work of the Special Advisor‟s office and weakened the UN‟s ability to effect tangible
change.1
In addition, true action is stultified in the bureaucratic trappings of the Security
Council. With respect to the responsibility to react, the UN lacks the peacekeeping
troops, and resources to successfully carry out a number of its peace keeping operations.2
Lacking the logistical and communication capacities to fulfill their mandates,
peacekeeping troops have had to innovate in order to survive- creating regional command
centers and sharing scarce resources such as helicopters. Moreover, its peacekeeping
operations in the African continent have lacked strong support and contribution from
Western States. Attempts made to establish standing armies for the United Nations and
others have continued to fail.
So how do we rectify these problems? The spectrum of responsibility and
responses available to the international community must be fully embraced and
1
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implemented. States must start addressing conflicts before they boil over into mass
atrocities and genocide. By utilizing peaceful diplomatic avenues to halting violence,
states can increase peace without necessarily increasing the cost attached to doing so.
The international community must emphasize the ongoing coordination of the United
Nations with other organizations, such as the African Union and International Criminal
Court. By doing so consistent messages and practices start to take form. The Special
Advisor‟s Office must take a more active role in communicating its mandate. It must
engage with member states to activate partnerships toward a better world. The SAPG
must take a stronger role in the collection of data on conflictual situations and create
alternative networks to mobilizing a response when the Security Council is visibly
unwilling to take action.
When peaceful means are ineffective, limited strategic military intervention must
be taken but only as a last resort. The hybridity of UN peacekeeping is a good step
forward. By strengthening regional and local forces to tackle the difficult task of
peaceful enforcement we are contributing to regional stability. Western states and NATO
must play a more active role in helping regional organizations build up their
peacekeeping operations and assist them in implementing more effective logistical and
communication capacities.
With the end of the Cold War and the rise of ethnically based violence in the
1990s the international community was forced to confront its failure to operationalize a
preventive mechanism stipulated in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The 1994 Rwandan, 1995 Bosnian, and 2003
Sudanese genocides taught us the large financial and human cost of poor political will
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and idling. With the introduction of verbal cues, UN bodies, and innovative new
approaches to preventive diplomacy, intervention and peacekeeping, the international
community has made significant strides in formulating a solid genocide prevention
regime. But there is still work to be done. Among other things, the international
community must continue to work to improve and diversify peacekeeping operations,
support states in their responsibility to protect, and engage civil society.
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Appendix 1: Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
Adopted by Resolution 260 (III) A of the United Nations General Assembly on 9 December 1948.

Article 1
The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in
time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to
punish.
Article 2
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as
such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Article 3
The following acts shall be punishable:
(a) Genocide;
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) Attempt to commit genocide;
(e) Complicity in genocide.
Article 4
Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3 shall be
punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private
individuals.
Article 5
The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective
Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present
Convention and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of
genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3.
Article 6
Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3 shall be
tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed,
or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those
Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.
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Article 7
Genocide and the other acts enumerated in Article 3 shall not be considered as political
crimes for the purpose of extradition.
The Contracting Parties pledge themselves in such cases to grant extradition in
accordance with their laws and treaties in force.
Article 8
Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take
such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the
prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in
Article 3.
Article 9
Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or
fulfillment of the present Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a
State for genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3, shall be submitted to
the International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to the dispute.
Article 10
The present Convention, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish
texts are equally authentic, shall bear the date of 9 December 1948.
Article 11
The present Convention shall be open until 31 December 1949 for signature on behalf of
any Member of the United Nations and of any non-member State to which an invitation
to sign has been addressed by the General Assembly.
The present Convention shall be ratified, and the instruments of ratification shall be
deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
After 1 January 1950, the present Convention may be acceded to on behalf of any
Member of the United Nations and of any non-member State which has received an
invitation as aforesaid.
Instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United
Nations.
Article 12
Any Contracting Party may at any time, by notification addressed to the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations, extend the application of the present Convention to all or
any of the territories for the conduct of whose foreign relations that Contracting Party is
responsible.
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Article 13
On the day when the first twenty instruments of ratification or accession have been
deposited, the Secretary-General shall draw up a proces-verbal and transmit a copy of it
to each Member of the United Nations and to each of the non-member States
contemplated in Article 11.
The present Convention shall come into force on the ninetieth day following the date of
deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification or accession.
Any ratification or accession effected subsequent to the latter date shall become effective
on the ninetieth day following the deposit of the instrument of ratification or accession.
Article 14
The present Convention shall remain in effect for a period of ten years as from the date of
its coming into force.
It shall thereafter remain in force for successive periods of five years for such Contracting
Parties as have not denounced it at least six months before the expiration of the current
period.
Denunciation shall be effected by a written notification addressed to the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations.
Article 15
If, as a result of denunciations, the number of Parties to the present Convention should
become less than sixteen, the Convention shall cease to be in force as from the date on
which the last of these denunciations shall become effective.
Article 16
A request for the revision of the present Convention may be made at any time by any
Contracting Party by means of a notification in writing addressed to the SecretaryGeneral.
The General Assembly shall decide upon the steps, if any, to be taken in respect of such
request.
Article 17
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall notify all Members of the United
Nations and the non-member States contemplated in Article 11 of the following:
(a) Signatures, ratifications and accessions received in accordance with Article 11;
(b) Notifications received in accordance with Article 12;
(c) The date upon which the present Convention comes into force in accordance with
Article 13;
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(d) Denunciations received in accordance with Article 14;
(e) The abrogation of the Convention in accordance with Article 15;
(f) Notifications received in accordance with Article 16.
Article 18
The original of the present Convention shall be deposited in the archives of the United
Nations.
A certified copy of the Convention shall be transmitted to all Members of the United
Nations and to the non-member States contemplated in Article 11.
Article 19
The present Convention shall be registered by the Secretary-General of the United
Nations on the date of its coming into force.
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